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“Christianity is not a religion but a relation.” The worldwide evangelization course Alpha​[1]​, an introduction course on the basics of the Christian faith, takes its starting point in this statement. It tries to redefine Christianity in personal and experiential terms. When I followed in 2007 an Alpha Course during a short study time overseas in Oxford, we started by exploring why the Christian faith is not boring, untrue and irrelevant but a life-changing relationship.​[2]​ We often hear pastors as well as members of Christian churches– whether they are more traditional, evangelical, charismatic, or liberal –speaking of their faith in terms of a personal relationship. “I am not religious. I have a relationship with God through Jesus Christ.” They do not want their church membership to be seen as a formality, but experience it in a very personal, existential way. Going to church and being a Christian is not a routine, but a conscious activity and choice. In many Christian traditions we find such an emphasis on personal faith. Probably the Pietistic and Puritan movements of the seventeenth-eighteenth century are the best known examples of this personal piety. The conscious experience of God’s grace (i.e. conversion or being born again) is connected to the idea that faith should be concerned with personal regeneration rather than with outward rituals and formulas.​[3]​ Mere church membership and baptism do not meet the conditions for true discipleship. Faith is associated with a personal component: the individual believer is justified by faith (the adagium of the sixteenth century Reformers) and thus has undergone a basic change of life. This change should be reflected in spirituality and acts. The personal and individual expression of faith is therefore very important. 
Besides this personal involvement, defining Christianity also carries the implication that God is perceived as a personal agent. God is not an abstract force or general spiritual power; He is a personal God. To state that God is a person is crucial for the Christian faith in a time where a concrete image of God is fading away, as a result of secularism and multi-religiosity. To me, personal involvement and commitment to the Christian faith is one of the essential elements of being a Christian. I can go to church and say the prayers, but the church cannot believe instead of me. At the end I am the believing Christian. When we return to the statement of the Alpha Course, we see that the term ‘religion’ is tacitly taken to be something abstract: it is distant, organized, and it is about things you believe. Religion is here a term for institutional faith and this is opposed to religion as personally experienced, internalized faith. The idea that Christianity is a relation and not a religion, therefore appeals to me. But if this is true at last, why should we still practice our faith in the Church? 
Nowadays, spirituality is wide-spread and well-accepted. Within the Christian tradition, spirituality can serve as the appropriate term for the intimate and individual concept of faith just described.​[4]​ Spirituality, or experienced faith, is authentic because it is an expression of the individual. Therefore, individual piety seems in some circles to be the litmus test for faith​[5]​: the hallmark of faith is personal appropriation and expression. For example, one of the clearest expressions of experienced faith I found in evangelical or Pentecostal congregations is lifting up your hands while singing praise and worship songs. 
Moreover, the present attention for faith as a relationship makes clear that we do not believe in order to receive certain goods: to be better persons, to obtain eternal life, or to be free due to God’s reconciliation. We receive these because we believe. Emphasis on the relation with God shows us therefore that this relationship is the very fundament and reason for believing in God. God takes the initiative to live in relation with us, and we answer this by confessing our faith in Him. The “quality” of our faith lays already in this relationship, with a theological term: in living our lives coram Deo. We live before God’s face, in His presence and as His partners. 

Personal love-relationship
Taking the starting point in Christian faith as a personal relationship with God in Jesus Christ, people often make comparisons with a relationship between two partners in a love-relationship. God and man are thus portrayed as relating to one another as two perfect lovers. Mostly, practical aspects are given as illustrations of the ways in which such a personal relationship of faith is lived out. For instance, lovers spend time together, and therefore we should also spend time with God. Spending time cannot be understood as doing things together, but is explained as being in each other’s presence. In Christianity, it is therefore realized in attending the church service and in prayer. Prayer can be described as “spending quality time together”, again a term stemming from the analogy of a relationship between partners.​[6]​ Lovers communicate about their inner feelings, their experiences, and their needs. Praying to God is thus interpreted analogically as communicating with one’s partner. These are modern interpretations of understanding faith as a relationship with God. Of course, in the Bible we already find sources for this interpretation. Israel is sometimes portrayed as being the lover or bride of God (Isa. 62:4, 12, Jer. 2:2) and the New Testament uses similar terms to denote the relationship between God and His people (Rev. 19:7, 22:17). Thus, a very intimate and personal picture of this relationship is given. So, the partner-relationship analogy offers a legitimate and valuable perspective. But where it contributes to a personal understanding of faith, it lacks capacity for giving substantial weight to the community of the Church. Apart from that, certain problems can occur. I would like to discuss those now to show the urgency and relevance of the present thesis. Afterwards we turn to the place of the Church.

Individual prayer versus communal prayer
We referred already to the practice of prayer. In some church traditions, and also in a tradition where I come from, prayer is mostly experienced as a private activity. In personal words the believer formulates his concerns, gratitude, adoration, and supplications. In the prayer, therefore, one mostly deals with issues that touch one’s private life – whether they are one’s own concerns or the concerns of persons one is close to. Linked to this content of prayer, is the practice of prayer itself: in evangelical circles (which are not only the evangelical congregations, but the evangelical voices found in very different denominations) there is a strong emphasis on taking quiet time. Quiet time can be practiced in many ways but often the believer takes a moment in rest and silence to meditate, pray, and read from the Bible. Daily devotion –some advice to take 20 minutes at least – will build up the relationship with God and teach the believer to trust Him more. It is advised to set a time and moment so the practice will not cease when you do not feel in the mood to pray, or to get up early, or to speak with God. Discipline is the medicine that will keep challenges like tiredness and distraction away. Discipline is the fruit of obedience​[7]​: like Christ was obedient to God, we need to be obedient and pray. The believer in this way has two possible experiences: one possibility is that he succeeds in taking his quiet time – something considered to be essential for the Christian in order to maintain his relationship with God. When he does so, his discipline will be rewarded with a growing intimacy with God. The other possibility is that he does not succeed in taking daily devotional time. Then a sense of failure and guilt is experienced. I cannot commit myself to God and I cannot discipline myself to take time for God. Because quiet time is implicitly or explicitly seen as the hallmark of personal faith, one can begin to question one’s own faith. Do I really want to live with God? Am I really a “reborn Christian” when I do not seem to have this real love in my heart? Struggling with a feeling of guilt and a possible lack of faith lays a heavy burden on the shoulders of the individual believer. He needs to take quiet time, but this is hard. When he succeeds for some time, he may experience to be closer to God. But then a period of spiritual drought will come and feelings of guilt or failure will take over again. 
	Although I do not wish to outline all the possible tensions related to a personal interpretation of Christian faith, I would like to point to two other particular areas where a tension can be experienced. The first is related to prayer again: when praying, someone is sustaining his relationship with God. A prayer should be personal, and therefore be said (out loud or inside) with attention and concentration. This is in itself a good thing: to try to understand what you pray and to formulate your own thoughts. At the same time, again a burden is laid on the shoulder of the believer: what if he gets distracted? What if he thinks of other things – and ceases to speak to God? What if he falls asleep? C.S. Lewis writes in his book Surprised by Joy​[8]​ that as a young boy, he tried to pray his collects with attention but failed to so: time and again he was distracted. Therefore he urged himself to keep on trying in order to pray the perfect prayer: with complete attention and concentration. Often Christian believers experience here a difficulty: when someone finds the time and discipline to pray, he may still be easily distracted. Some believers will not experience this difficulty because they do not regard their distraction as seriously wrong; their time of prayer is just prayer, whether they speak directly with God or whether their mind takes a flight to different areas of their life. So, distraction does not always lead to a sense of guilt and lack of faith but often the suggestion is made that it should be the case. For guilt can bring you to repent and to try again. In the case of C.S. Lewis, however, it was one of the factors that made him lose his faith.
	The second area of tension is the appropriation of the Psalms (in German: Aneignung)​[9]​. Christians read and sing the Psalms of David in the liturgy of the church. They also might read the Psalms for themselves, since their literary genre allows personal attribution. Many psalms can be read in a personal way: The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want… The Lord will lead me in my personal decisions and through difficult or challenging circumstances. He will guide me and make sure I am safe. This interpretation has a very important and valuable side: it involves the believer closely in what he reads, i.e. it intimately connects his personal life to the guidance and protection of the Shepherd. The believer thus identifies himself with what is written, said and sung. It can function as a source of encouragement, consolation, and hope. Hence, the Psalms offer to the believer a very personal and existential expression of his faith. In May 2007, I was offered a new perspective at Hydepark Theological Seminary​[10]​. When church musician dr. A. Eikelboom gave a lecture on the history of the Psalms as we sing them in the Protestant Church of The Netherlands, he showed that there is another way of interpreting the Psalms. In the Reformed or Calvinistic tradition where I come from, we are used to sing the Psalms in the church service. Eikelboom understands the liturgy of the church primarily as a gathering of the world before Gods face. In this way the church represents the world in worship and petition: it brings thanks to God and it asks for His providence for those in need. Singing a Psalm therefore gives voice to the homeless woman in Darfur or to the old man who has just heard he is incurably ill.​[11]​ It gives a voice to those who cannot sing and to those who do not have the words to lay their lives before God. Psalm 23 now becomes a prayer for Gods protection and guidance of the world and His flock: “Lord, be the Shepherd of the world.” It even has a prophetic outlook: “Lord, you will be Shepherd of your people.” The Psalms have become individualized and thus have narrowed the “I” in the Psalm to me personally. Emotion is involved when we sing the Psalms; I should relate the Psalm to the personal experiences of my life or otherwise the Psalm has no meaning to me.  Here, a collective understanding of the Psalm would be fruitful. The “I” in the Psalms is then in most cases much further reaching than just me. I cannot attribute all the Psalms to my life and my situation, but this does not mean I do not need to have any experience when I sing them. I can sing them for others. I can identify myself with them, because I know I am singing for the world in need. The individual interpretation of the Psalms seems to be very enriching but is in fact an impoverishment.​[12]​

Two contemporary theologians
From these areas of prayer and praise where the personal-relationship analogy tends to create problems for the importance of the Church-community, I now would like explain how I arrived at my research question. The significance of individual and communal interpretations of certain faith practices has shown me that it is relevant to investigate their systematical backgrounds. Two years ago, I was reading some work of Vincent Brümmer, a systematic theologian in the Netherlands. In February 2007 we invited him to our theological student’s society to give a lecture on his views on atonement. His views inspired me, because they speak of the Christian faith in a passionate and existential way. His systematic theology is not about traditional theological loci like revelation, God’s nature, and creation. Brümmer speaks of the relationship Christians have with God and how this colors their lives. This existential perspective on believing was very refreshing for me; until I read his work, I did not encounter a systematic theologian with whom I could to this extent identify myself as a Christian believer and theologian. During my theological studies, I learned to formulate problems in theological terms. This is helpful, but it also makes it more difficult to communicate these problems (and their possible solutions) to non-theologians. Brümmer’s work gave me tools to overcome this gap and to speak in very concrete and down-to-earth terms about theological issues. 
When I was thinking about a topic for this thesis, I came across an article of dr. E. S. Klein Kranenburg in Confessioneel, a monthly magazine of the reformed faction within the Dutch Reformed Church​[13]​. He writes about “evangelicalisation” in The Netherlands, a development which has wider scope than the European mainland. As stated above, evangelical influences often emphasize personal piety. Klein Kranenburg expects congregations to encounter certain difficulties in the near future; one of them is the tension between ‘individual and community’. Due to the increasing individualization in our postmodern society, people bring their individualistic perspectives into the church. This tendency concerns politicians and citizens constantly. The tension which can occur between the perspective of the individual and the community is very much a problem of our time in society and for faith communities. When Christianity needs to be experiential (“a relationship”), the individual gets priority over the community. Why does the believer still need a community when he can practice his faith on his own? On the moral level of religion, he can do well to others disregarding whether they are from the church or not. Mostly it will be acknowledged that fellowship is needed for being a Christian. In contact with others, one can learn from each other’s way of believing. For example, someone can receive support in times of need or one can grow in being like Jesus. Community building according to evangelicals is mostly concerned with this mutual fellowship. It is desperately needed in the heydays of individualism and consumerism. 
One could object that giving priority to communal above individual perspectives will lead finally to the annihilation of individual persons. We need to be careful in giving too much importance to the communal perspective; space for the individual needs to be warranted. However, when we acknowledge that the individualism of these days distresses postmodern societies, we see that both perspectives need to be in balance. Of course, individualism did not only cause egoism: we consider it as a good that the place of the individual is acknowledged in opposition to anonymity and uniformity. In totalitarian systems like communism and extreme nationalism, individual persons are not allowed to express themselves apart from a certain group. People are forced to be like others because authenticity is experienced as a threat for the system. In the sixties and seventies of the 20th century, people fought for the rights of the individual. We acknowledge the fruits of these movements, but are nowadays faced with too individualistic trends. Egoism is on the extreme of individualism. People in society think: “I am the centre of the world and my rights are most important.” Such an attitude cannot be approved because living in a society requires one to take others into account as well. Therefore, I object to extreme individualism and not to the importance of the individual as such. We cannot but acknowledge that we are individuals, even if we wish to show that this individuality is very relational in nature.

As Christian communities, we need to reflect on the urgency of our congregations. Why do we need the church? Of course, the church offers a place of identification and belonging, support in times of need, ritual when life’s circumstances ask for it. But any gathering or social construction can offer this kind of fellowship. What makes it urgent to have and be part of the Church? In the work of the Greek Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas I found new perspectives on the way the Church is needed in the world. He states that the Church is the image of God and by its way of being shows who God is: “It [the Church] is a way of relationship with the world, with other people and with God, an event of communion, and that is why it cannot be realized as the achievement of an individual, but only as an ecclesial fact.”​[14]​ This view offers a new way of looking to Christianity: priority is not given to someone’s own devotional life but to the life of the Church.  
In my own words, the Church represents Jesus in the world. She is the image of Christ, she is His Body. He has no other body than the Church. Marcel Sarot told me that he was impressed by a crucifix in a Belgian church. The hands of the corpus of Christ were broken off. Under the crucifix was written in French: “I have no hands but yours.” The Church is the hands of Jesus in this world in order to heal and restore, to give and to care. The different parts work together and constitute together Jesus’ Body. One individual believer cannot work as all of the body parts and therefore the Church is needed in order that Jesus continues to be in this world. 
	With regard to the practice of prayer, the Church offers us words for praying. By handing over the words of Jesus (especially in the prayer He taught us) and by its liturgy, it encourages us to pray together and lay the world in God’s hands. In the Roman Catholic and Eastern Othodox traditions, these aspects have received more emphasis than in the Protestant tradition where I come from. When we struggle as individuals to pray constantly or to find the right words, the Church continues to pray for us. Some may ask: is this not a cheap way of doing away with the responsibility of the believer and his personal involvement with God? In the Church, in Christ, we are related to Him and related with each other. Therefore, when the Church prays, Jesus prays. He prays in us and before the face of the Father. And even when we are not able to pray, we have Christ as our head to pray for us. This communal perspective on prayer shows why we need the Church as the Body of Christ. It offers the necessary counterweight to our individualistic prayer-life, which might result in believers struggling with their devotion and spirituality.

Research Question and Outline
This thesis aims to be a research thesis and therefore focuses on investigation and knowledge. The field of study is Systematic Theology. This thesis presents two ways of perceiving the relationship between God and man from which an integrative model will be sought. We start from the definition of Christianity as a personal relation between God and believer. Of course, Christianity should not be reduced to this definition; it also has to do with how we engage with the world around us (i.g. others in need, our natural environment). But I wish to focus here on the human interaction with God. God is not an abstract reality, intelligent Designer, or general metaphysical force. He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; He is the living Father, Son, and Spirit. 
The spectrum that I am trying to investigate stretches from individual to communal. The two theologians whose views I will discuss do not represent these extreme positions, but they tend to one of these directions. Brümmer’s model tends towards individualism although he is not an individualist theologian. I have chosen to research the theology of another theologian who tends to the other end of the spectrum. In John Zizioulas I found theology that emphasizes community. I came across Zizioulas’ name in a book on Christian Orthodox Churches.​[15]​ His name was referred to in the context of Eucharistic ecclesiology and I saw a counter voice to Brümmer here. Zizioulas’ work has been read and adapted by theologians like C. Gunton, C. Schwöbel, F. LeRon Shults, and R. DelColle. This is how I got into contact with this Greek orthodox theologian and decided to read his work. The research question that lies underneath, guides and pushes this investigation is:
If we construe Christianity as a personal relation between God and man, should we interpret this relationship as (1) a relation between two individuals or (2) between two communal entities? 
My ultimate aim is not merely to find out what their theological positions are. I will perform a close-reading from their work, aiming to establish a dialogue between them. 







1.1 Fides quaerens intellectum
This is a study in the field of systematic theology. Systematic theology is the part of theology in which one strives for coherence and conceptual clarification. Here, Anselm’s adagium is point of departure: Fides Quaerens Intellectum. We do not seek to understand in order that we may believe; it is faith that seeks understanding. Systematic theology aims at understanding and clarifying what Christians believe. Theologians cannot prescribe us what to believe; rather, they present us the options from which we can choose. But they not only describe, they also produce by formulating fruitful proposals. A systematic theological proposal needs to meet certain criteria before it can be accepted. Important is that “the conceptual designs produced by systematic theology have to prove their worth in the lives of the community of believers.

​[17]​
	Theology has many subdisciplines (history, sociology, psychology, etc.); systematic theology comes close to philosophy since it uses the same tool for its practice. This tool or method is conceptual analysis. Concepts that we use in describing aspects of faith are analysed to find their implications, presuppositions, and consequences. For example, what does it mean to speak about the omnipotence of God? The systematic theologian tries to answer this question by looking to the Bible, his tradition and context. He tries to define his proposal as coherently and comprehensively as possible. I will explain these criteria one by one. But before doing so, I need to show in what way we are even able to speak about God.  

1.2. Method
Theology reflects on what people believe and claim about God. In some academic circles, claiming to have knowledge about God is unheard-of. Man is not able to know anything about the transcendent reality; how would our mind ever be capable to understand what eternity and omnipotence mean? Reason is evaluated to be unable to formulate concepts about God. How can our mind grasp anything of God? Traditionally, this is claimed to be possible because of revelation. God has chosen to reveal Himself and truths concerning the world, which otherwise would not have been known. God chooses to “enter” our human reality and enables man to know things about Him.
	Revelation does not cause us to permeate God’s nature, thoughts, and being. With a Bible verse: He “lives in an unapproachable light, whom no-one has seen or can see” (1 Tim 6:16). God reveals but remains a mystery too. Revelation is a guarantee that we can know things about God but it confronts us at the same time with a difficulty. Human language and human concepts are always learned from and shaped by the creaturely world. The content of our thoughts is determined by and applied to creaturely structures. How can our statements then be applied adequately to God? How can the words we use in daily language be meaningful when we use them for speaking about God?  
	Brümmer shows that a word should not be understood as a kind of sticker but as a tool for communication.​[18]​ We do not name things as they are, but we use words so we can communicate. Words can carry more than one concept; their meaning is derived from the way we use them. For example, I can use the word ‘eye’ when speaking about God, because I know that in that case I use a different concept than human eyes. Now, only certain implications of the word ‘eye’ can be carried over to God. We do not speak of God’s iris, pupil, and lens. In technical terms: analogy, metaphor, or figurative language, expresses this “translation” that has to be made when we apply words to God. Our words can be appropriate for speaking about a transcendent God because they are analogies. This also explains why words like omnipotence are hard to grasp, since such words do not belong to the realm of human experiential language. 
	Concerning this metaphorical use of religious language, I will present the view of Brümmer in Chapter 2. At this point it is necessary to explain how we understand those metaphors. Sometimes, it has been thought that metaphors do not depict reality at all; they are mere figures of speech. But, “truth claims cannot be eliminated from religion.”​[19]​ In religious language, factual claims have two functions: (1) they present a view on reality, and (2) this constitutes the way we live our lives. The claim, God is a rock, has likewise two meanings: it presupposes that God is steadfast and trustworthy (there are only some aspects of the meaning of the word ‘rock’ that can be applied to God; one cannot conclude that God is hard or lifeless) and it makes that we can entrust ourselves to God when we are insecure. Our very relation to God is involved. Religious claims are thus referential and existential. ​[20]​

1.3 Criteria
If we want to speak about God and understand this speech as reality-depicting, existential, and relational, on which grounds can we select relevant and adequate metaphors to express the relationship with God? I will list six criteria, three of which are methodological and three of which concern content​[21]​:
(1)	Critical theological realism: systematic theology should not merely discuss what people believe, how they express their faith, how they live their lives. Theology should also make assertions on the reality of God, the world, and man, and how they relate. 
(2)	Logical consistency: we cannot believe contradictory assertions. Therefore, we attempt to explain what we mean and what the implications and consequences are. We do not pretend that we can understand God fully by reasoning logically. But the aim is to avoid agnosticism and to strive for conceptual clarity. “Within these limits we should do our best to achieve a coherent understanding of the ways in which God relates to us. Beyond these limits it behoves us to remain agnostic and apophatic.”​[22]​ 
(3)	Comprehensive coherence: to be consistent in the claims we make, is not enough for systematic theology to be fruitful. The claims also need to be coherent: the issues addressed in this thesis should fit with one-another. I do not merely discuss some topic, but I hope to present a related discussion. Comprehensive coherence will also play a role: my aim is to propose a model which is not limited, for example, to a doctrine of God. Rather, it needs to address more than one theological topic. The model we are searching for should be applicable in the practical circumstances of the Christian believer. Systematic theologians need to consider the implications of their positions for other areas of theology.​[23]​ For reasons of space and time, I will not discuss issues of coherence with other than theological assertions. 
(4)	Consonance with the Christian tradition: in theologising, we do not start at the beginning. We start from within a tradition of theology, and may learn from our predecessors. Three elements are involved in this tradition: (a) Biblical testimony, (b) theological traditions, and (c) church traditions. The Bible is the main source of theology but, of course, every reading of the Bible is an interpretation. We should also consider the corpus of theological literature because it prevents that we reinvent the wheel over and again. Over and above this, theology is also embedded within the tradition of the church. Systematic theology cannot disregard this but should relate itself to the identity and practices of the Church. I do not mean that we need to search for agreement with the tradition in all areas, but neither can we suggest replacing all ecclesial tradition and starting from scratch. In Chapter 5, it will become clear how the tradition of the Church plays a role in doing theology. On the other hand, this is a study in systematic theology; exegetical questions or the trustworthiness of historical analyses will not be debated here. Dogmatics should take these discussions and the relation to systematic theology into account. Systematic theology differs from dogmatics in that it “does not presuppose any confessional commitment.”​[24]​ So, I do not make a theological judgement here but I demarcate my area of research.
(5)	Adequacy for this time and place: in my Introduction, I have already referred to some practices and problems of our present time. In the months that I have worked on this Thesis, I noticed how interested people were in my subject. To non-theologians (and sometimes non-Christians) I explained that my study was about interpreting faith as a relationship between God and man, and whether this should be taken individually or communally. They experienced this as an area of tension, not only in the several Christian traditions but also in society. Systematic theology needs to understand the present time and connect to its questions. In choosing its subjects, the systematic theologian should discuss these issues and respond to them with intelligibility. This determines neither our outcomes nor our method. When people can no longer believe in traditional formulas, we are not forced to declare them useless and unfruitful. We do not need to choose another metaphor to explain our position but we need to argue why we choose this metaphor. 
(6)	Personal understanding of God: Many contemporary theologians emphasise that God is a person.​[25]​ Often this is opposed to syncretistic or liberal religious views, which present ‘God’ as a divine force or an impersonal power. Others see God as a person who is not relating Himself actively to the world. This position is called deism. By stating that God is a person, these two views are written off. Therefore, I will also refer to God with the personal pronouns as used in the Christian tradition (i.e. “He”, “Him”, and “His”). 
Nevertheless, to adopt a personal view of God does not mean that He is a person just as we are persons. If we can only know God in an analogical way, the claim that God is a person should also be understood in a metaphorical way. K. Ward makes clear that we need to think in personal terms for the sake of personal devotion, but that Western personal theism is one-sided.​[26]​ God is portrayed too much in creaturely images and language. According to Ward, it is misleading to claim that God is a person, for He does not possess certain essential properties which define personhood. Clearly, God’s physical properties are instinctively taken to be metaphorical. We do not think God really possesses eyes and feet. When Christians speak and think in such anthropomorphical ways, their claims need to be heavily qualified.​[27]​ Moreover, in the tradition understanding of God, He is held to be unable to suffer and unable to sin. Do these elements not belong to the very essence of being a person? Are we still justified in calling God a person when He lacks certain necessary conditions for calling a being a person? “God may possess person-properties without thereby being a person.”​[28]​ Four reasons are given why it is problematic to call God a person: (1) God’s ineffability. We cannot know God’s essential nature for He transcends our understanding. To state that God is a person is therefore anthropomorphic language about God. This derogates God’s ineffable nature. (2) The model of a person is too external to apply to the relationship-models that are traditionally Christian. This means that the relationship between God and man cannot meet the conditions of two persons: by His indwelling Spirit, God comes much closer than any other person is able to. We take a relation of persons as a relation of distinct beings of the same sort, who come together but remain distinct. God is not only in relation with us, but also present and working within us.​[29]​ (3) We believe that Jesus Christ is a person. At the same time we hold that God is a person. How can these two statements be true when we do not want to be Unitarian or cease to be monotheists? (4) If Jesus Christ is a person and God is a person, we are inclined to view Christ as consisting of two persons. This is not the orthodox view, for Christ is one person with two natures. Ward offers his solution to these problems: he proposes to speak of a supra-personal view. In this supra-personal view of God, He is understood to include and transcend personal elements. He does not wish to deny that God is a person at all who might possess certain person-qualities. Rather, Ward defines God as a quite unique sort of person.​[30]​ With this definition, we make explicit the qualifications needed when conceptualizing God as a person. It is an application of the notion that all human knowledge of God is analogically.







2. Vincent Brümmer on Fellowship with God

2.1 Introduction 
In the Christian tradition God is perceived as good, trustworthy, timeless, loving, righteous, and in many other ways. By reading the Bible, God reveals who He is. On the other hand, believers have always claimed to be unable to grasp the nature of God. He dwells in a light that no man can approach. Theology should therefore speak and remain silent. In the intercourse with God, believers articulate their faith. For Vincent Brümmer, prayer is therefore the key to the relationship between God and man, and even the hermeneutical key for the doctrine of God. If we want to know who God is, we need to reflect on how we pray. In prayer we notice how we understand God’s personal qualities and how we relate ourselves to Him. Brümmer approaches the doctrine of God primarily from the relationship believers have with Him. Systematic theology tries to grasp features from this relation as encountered in biblical testimony, ecclesial history, and personal experience. In this chapter I will outline the proposal of Vincent Brümmer for analyzing the relationship with on God. His most recent books​[31]​ are about Christian doctrine reinterpreted from the perspective of God’s ultimate goal with humanity: to live in fellowship with Him. Fellowship is perceived as analogous to human love-relationships. Whereas other systematicians have shown interest in God’s nature, attributes, and essence, Brümmer starts from the connection between God and man. Let us take a look at this theologian, his position in theology, and how he analyses the relationship between God and man. 

2.2.1 Introducing Vincent Brümmer
Vincent Brümmer was born in South-Africa, in 1932.​[32]​ His father, Nicolaas Johannes Brümmer, was a professor in philosophy and theology at Stellenbosch University for 30 years, and a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church. His grandfather from mother’s side taught the same subjects at the same university, and held good contacts with Scotland and The Netherlands. Vincent Brümmer followed their pathway by studying theology and philosophy in Stellenbosch. At the theological faculty of Stellenbosch University, he experienced sometimes tensions between critical reflection and conservative traditionalism.​[33]​ At that time, he discovers that theology has to engage both with the surrounding context and the tradition it finds itself in. Proclaiming the gospel does not make sense if it does not connect to its hearers in their context. Just accepting and handing on what has been said before is not a fruitful way of doing theology; we should dare to question our beliefs and to renew them. Later on, he would comment on this in his book on the doctrine of Atonement, which offers a good illustration of how Brümmer wants to contribute to the intelligibility of the Christian faith for contemporary believers.​[34]​ “If such doctrines at the heart of the Christian faith involve logical and moral conundrums, is it not asking rather much of us if our salvation is made to depend on our ‘truly and firmly’ believing them? How can we be required to believe doctrines, which we cannot understand? Can our eternal salvation be made to depend on such a sacrificium intellectum?”​[35]​
He spent a year in Harvard (US) where Paul Tillich was teaching at that time (1957-1958). Tillich taught his students to think within his own theological system; Problems should be interpreted and solved from within this system. Brümmer finds it hard to take such a system in an absolute way: “The conceptual model enables us to discover features of the world which we would otherwise have overlooked. However, it also filters out other aspects and prevents us from seeing them. For this reason it is essential that we should guard against making our models absolute and considering the way they enable us to look at the world as the one and only way in which the world should be looked at.”​[36]​ He lives with his wife for two years in The Netherlands (1959-1961), moves then to Oxford for a year, goes back to South-Africa and starts his professorate in The Netherlands in 1967. For the next 30 years, he teaches at Utrecht University while frequently visiting foreign countries for teaching and studying purposes (UK, Sweden, Ireland, Germany, etc.). He makes an effort to show how philosophical methods can serve the theological enterprise since his aim is to do philosophy, not to study philosophies.​[37]​ His method needs to be relevant for contemporary problems in theology and should not merely offer abstract philosophical instruments. In teaching and publications, he tries to show how we can apply philosophical, conceptual analysis to theological questions. Until today, he still preaches in the Dutch protestant church and publishes books on systematic theology.

2.2.2 Publications​[38]​
Brümmer is primary interested in the intersection of philosophy and theology. In his early career, he published mostly on the field of philosophical debates with relevance for religion. He wrote his dissertation on the philosophy of the Dutch theologian/politician Herman Dooyeweerd, who tried to demonstrate that Calvinism can serve as the general foundation for theoretical thought. However, in exploring his own pathway for speaking about God, Brümmer increasingly orientates himself towards systematic theology. He published articles on theodicy, grace, and prayer in the years 1981-1984 in order to show how philosophy can be relevant for theology. For his book What are we doing when we pray? (1984) Brümmer receives international appreciation. The book was written and published in English but also translated in German and Dutch. A revised version is forthcoming in 2008. Speaking of a personal God appears in 1992; in this book, Brümmer shows how God relates to us with respect to grace, evil, and His agency in the world. His book on the analysis of love-relationships is titled The Model of Love (​http:​/​​/​www.kalahari.net​/​e-trader​/​referral.asp?toolbar=mweb&linkid=5&partnerid=126&sku=429404​) (1993). In this book, Brümmer develops his views on the divine-human relationship which were originally presented in his two earlier books.​[39]​ The result is a full-fledged model, which applies synthetically various aspects of human fellowship to the relation of God and man. The edited volume Understanding the Attributes of God (1995) is another result of Brümmer’s professorate: together with his PhD-students he publishes a book about the attributes of God. Each article discusses one of Gods attributes. His view on love as relationship has by then become Brümmer’s key model for understanding the relationship between God and man, and reappears in Atonement, Christology and the Trinity (2005), where he surveys our understanding of the relationship with God in connection to interreligious dialogue. In 2006, Brümmer’s Collected Writings were published by Ashgate. In this book, he not only collected his main writings, but also provides short reflections and comments on these. It is a tribute to his academic contributions. 

2.3 Theology and Philosophy
During his academic career, Brümmer has constantly been reflecting on the interaction between theology and philosophy. Already at Stellenbosch he became attentive that philosophy should not be looked at suspiciously but as an ancilla theologiae​[40]​: providing helpful tools for the theological enterprise. Brümmer’s theological starting point is not in philosophy but clearly in Christian theology. He does not start from a philosophical concept of God (e.g. the foundation of Being, or the Highest Being), which subsequently has to be colored with Christian features in order to speak as a Christian theologian. He rather uses conceptual analysis as a useful instrument when doing systematic theology. Systematic theology is to analyze philosophically Christian concepts in order to explain and clarify them.​[41]​ By imagining what the implications of a certain understanding of an idea are, he examines how we can understand what we believe. And at the same time, Brümmer tries to offer new proposals (“innovations”) for understanding what we believe. These are exercises in recollection and imagination.​[42]​ 
Accordingly, Brümmer analyses ideas about God that are already given in the Christian tradition and does not endeavor to begin with a generic concept of God: doing so would result in a “de-contextualization of the Christian concept of God (…). This is disastrous, (…) since the concept of God, like all other concepts, derives its meaning from the form of life in which it is employed and the language-game in which this is expressed. Divorced from this context it is either misconstrued or meaningless.”​[43]​ Wittgenstein phrases this form of life as the place where a language game is played, in this case in the life lived by the Christian believer in a certain time and place.​[44]​ Brümmer’s purpose is to discover and reformulate the meaning of Christian concepts in contemporary language and ideas. 

2.4.1 Models in systematic theology
We have said that God has many characteristics, like goodness and righteousness. Brümmer makes an effort to analyze the concept of the love of God, but what are his reasons for choosing this character trait? He reflects systematically on love-relationships between human beings and explains how they can shed light on the ways in which God is loving. In exploring such a model of love, he seeks to understand how the love of God is seen in relation to human love. Nevertheless, we need to be aware that God is not like human persons, so from this analysis we cannot carry over all aspects to God. 
Brümmer speaks of metaphors and models as a way of dealing with reality: we engage with reality by comparing and classifying. By ordering the data, we are providing ourselves with the necessary tools for thinking and speaking about reality. Language therefore structures our perception of reality. Both language and reality interact with our mental structures.​[45]​ In this function, language helps us to understand how reality is structured but at the same time, it selects and filters. When we understand that all our language is in this way metaphorical, we see how our faith claims are to be related to God. In the words of Sallie McFague, metaphors always whisper: “it is and it is not…”​[46]​ Hence, a metaphor has certain implications for the meaning of the two terms involved. For example, God as ‘rock’ means that God is steadfast and trustworthy. We do not mean that God is like a stone, an object rather than a person. It is crucial to understand the metaphor properly, and to learn which implications of the metaphor are appropriate to think of and which are not.​[47]​ The word ‘rock’ has more connotations than firmness, but we do not want to apply all of these to God. In all our language about God this is the case, which brings us to the necessity of critical inquiry on the similarities and differences between our metaphors and God.
In speaking about God, we must distinguish between metaphors with a limited application (like ‘rock’) and “sustained and systematic metaphors”.​[48]​ These we call models. We have already outlined that metaphors should not lead to a closed, definitive system. We need to hear the whispering: “it is and it is not…” We need to keep in mind that models also select which implications of other, less central metaphors are to be carried over to our object and which ones are not suitable for this. For theology, Biblical stories provide us with images, the raw material for conceptualizing those models. In the Bible we do not encounter God as an independent reality on His own, but as engaging Himself with us. The Bible is thus the source of information about the relationship between God and man.​[49]​ “All the metaphors and models employed in the Bible are primarily relational: they are intended to indicate the ways in which we are to relate to God.”​[50]​
The models that have proven to be most fruitful for the Christian concept of God are personal models. The metaphor of God as ‘rock’ has limited potential for ordering our thoughts about God while the model of God as a shepherd surely has more potential. A mere mosaic of metaphors will not do, however, since they are not connected to one another​[51]​. In order to develop a coherent view of God, systematic theology selects and develops root-metaphors.​[52]​ All aspects of faith are sought to be integrated with help of such a key-model. This is necessary because sometimes certain implications of different metaphors can contradict each other. A root-metaphor or key model can provide an interpretational framework in the light of which we can gain a proper understanding of all other metaphors. The danger is to overlook the different sides of God, life, and faith, and to end up with a one-sided theology. A key-model should keep different aspects together in a coherent theory, without diminishing the heterogeneity. “Systematic theologians may never claim to have produced the final conceptual form for the faith.”​[53]​ 

2.4.2. Key-model: Love as relationship
In systematic theology we try to discover, organize, and classify what we believe concerning God. From there we try to see how we can relate ourselves to Him and how to live our lives. “God’s factual characteristics are only known to us (and relevant from a religious point of view) to the extent that they are constitutive assumptions for the way of life that we are to adopt in relation to God.”​[54]​ Christians believe that God has revealed Himself in history which is written down in the Bible. This tradition speaks of the Lord God who is known through His revealing involvement with the world. The character traits of God are the qualities that we discern in His acts.​[55]​ Usually theologians inquire what kind of concept of love the Bible portrays. But love in the Bible is a concept which cannot be reduced to one attitude or deed. Brümmer’s ambition is to inquire what it brings us when we take love as a root-metaphor for the relationship between God and man. He does not classify ‘love’ as merely another attribute of God. Above we have outlined how we should understand his method: “Love seems to be central to our understanding of the nature of God, who in I John 4:7-9,16 is even said to be love, and thus also for the way in which the other characteristics are to be understood.”​[56]​ Because the Bible shows us how we can live our lives coram Deo (in the face of God), biblical language is relational in nature. Therefore it offers space for taking love as a core concept for the interaction between the believer and his God.
Relationality determines Brümmer’s approach for the shape of his idea of love. The way he speaks of love, is not in the sense of a certain attitude which would comprehensively describe God as loving.​[57]​ Such attitudes are usually seen as a description of the nature of love (e.g. as exclusive attention, ecstatic union, passionate suffering, need- or gift-love​[58]​), thereby implying that other views are shortcoming and inadequate. Brümmer claims that his key model of love as relationship is able to include all attitudes of love and should therefore be seen as overarching. “Love has generally been taken to be an attitude of one person toward another, rather than as a relation between persons.”​[59]​ The attitudes are the forms of love, expressing a loving relationship between two persons. Love is therefore the integrating concept for the proper understanding of the Christian God. Like cement makes bricks cohere, love is the concept that brings cohesion between God’s character traits. In Brümmer’s terms, love is a root-metaphor or key-model; within this model he tries to integrate all aspects of faith. Our next question will thus be: “What would be the conceptual price for taking the love of God as a key model in theology? This depends of course on what we mean by ‘love’…”​[60]​

2.5.1 Human relations: three types
In many of Brümmer’s works, we find a threefold distinction between types of relationships. Brümmer does not wish to sketch three kinds of love-relationships, as three ways of expressing love, but wishes to gain insight into the nature of a relationship of love by exploring types of relationships.​[61]​ It is not to say that these models cover all human relationships, or to say that we find such model-relationships in life. Mostly we encounter a mixture of them in a relationship. The first type is an impersonal relationship characterized by manipulation. One of the partners in the relationship is a personal agent but the other one is treated as an object. The person who causes something within the other, tries to control the latter. This can be out of a desire for self-satisfaction, but it can also be for the good of the other. The more power is exercised, the more manipulative the relationship. The relationship is therefore causal in nature. In this type we find that one person – the one dominated – cannot act as a free agent. He is not respected as a person with choices, responsibility, and an own identity. Moreover, the person is not respected in his being, since he is the object of manipulative power. The causal agency of one of the partners is both the necessary and sufficient condition for the relationship; he begins, continues and ends the relation.​[62]​ Thus, one of the parties involved is passive and has an impersonal function.
The second and third type of relationships are not causal but free. Both can serve as models for love-relationships. The second type has as central concept contract or agreement. This is a personal relationship, for two persons interact with each other by means of rights and duties. Both parties can freely enter into the relationship by agreeing to the contract. Mostly this will be done because it is advantageous; an employee has the benefit of payment and the employer is sure of the job being done. Here power can have a place as well, but the relationship is founded on the fact that it brings advantage to both parties. So the relationship as well as the other party can be replaced without damage to the benefits: it does not matter whether A or B does the job, as long as the job is done according to the agreement. And, it is not essential that both parties like one another, as long as the contract is kept. Therefore, this relation has an instrumental value.​[63]​ The other party is a free person because he can choose to enter the relationship in case he expects it to be advantageous. But he will not be valued because of his personality and therefore his identity will not rest upon it. 
Our third and last type of relationships involves two persons who seek identification with one another.​[64]​ Both parties are free to cause, shape, and end the relationship. Such a personal relationship is characterized by mutual fellowship​[65]​; they identify with one another, and make the other’s interest their own. Because I remain myself, but identify with my friend, “…I want his good, not merely as much as I want my own, but as being my own… Aristotle’s definition of a friend as a heteros autos, another self, catches exactly the ambiguity.”​[66]​ It means that the benefit of the other –who is respected as a free person – is strived for. 
In the case of relationships of rights and duties, a commitment is made on the basis of the future actions of the other. When you do what you have promised to do, I will sustain the relationship as we have agreed upon (which means that you will be rewarded). You have value for me because you do certain things for me. Your personality does not matter, as long as you render the services and merits we agreed upon. In evaluating my attitude to you, I weigh the value your services have for me. Whether I enter our contractual relationship, how we give it shape, and whether we continue, depends on the balance of costs and benefits. By means of certain more or less objective standards, I judge the relationship and your actions. I will only reject your actions, if you do not confirm to the standard.​[67]​ I derive value from you, but do not bestow value on you, like in the case of mutual fellowship. In the latter case, I would recognize value in you but also give you value by identifying myself with you. Hence, the other is irreplaceable and matters as a person. Even if someone else would have the same personal qualities, he would not be the same person and so we would not have the same relationship. Hence, love is concerned with the person and not primarily with his qualities. This point helps us to understand why parents love each of their children equally but not in the same ways: the relationship they have with each of their children is different so their love will be different. ​[68]​ They need not love them less when their relationship is different. Parents can love each child as much equally though in different ways.
In loving someone, I commit myself to the other and I try to express my love by acting according to it. Loving feelings may contribute, but they do not determine the decision to act according to my commitment. When I am motivated by a certain feeling to commit myself, this does not overrule me by making me passive. So, I have chosen to love the other person, which contains the promise to perform my actions upon this commitment. My behavior is above all based upon my intentions and secondly upon your moral merits. An important point should be made in this context: my personal identity is something I choose freely. Although certain options are given, I am a responsible agent who freely decides what constructs my identity. A long-lasting relationship can be realized due to this conviction: changes in circumstances, events, and happenings can come across the life we live, but I am the one who decides how to relate to them. When I do this with a partner, or in relation to the one I love, I can be true to this relationship in observing the wellbeing of my partner in the choices I make.​[69]​ Finally, this shows us why being unfaithful to the fellowship, is being unfaithful to oneself. My personal identity is at risk when the commitment I made is not complied with. Mutual fellowship is about personal identity.
My personal identity is not only shaped due to the relationships I have with other people. My identity is also confirmed when others show love for me. With them loving me, they show that I have value for them. They acknowledge that I am a person, for they treat me as a free and autonomous individual. They consider me irreplaceable and give me therefore the confirmation that I am unique. 

2.5.2 Human love: five characteristics
From the conceptual analyses of love we can draw five characteristics of a love-relationship between humans.​[70]​ These are very much intertwined and not to be taken as separate qualities. We distinguish rather than separate them. In the next section we will explore how they are to be related to God. We have seen that a love-relationship should involve two free persons. As individual agents they can bring about, maintain, and end the relationship; they both freely choose to be related to each other. A second feature is related to this: the two autonomous persons have to be free, even when one longs for love to be returned. A love relationship longs for reciprocity but can only succeed when the love is returned freely. This makes the whole project of loving one another risky and vulnerable. The other can choose not to love! I am giving my love freely and I cannot assume the other will love in return.​[71]​ Thirdly, a personal relationship should not be concerned primarily with one’s own wellbeing, but it should lead to identification of oneself with the other. A lover chooses to pursue the benefit of the loved one and in this way seeks for the happiness of the partner. Furthermore, a love-relationship has intrinsic rather than instrumental value: the other as a person matters to me, more than how he behaves or what he does for me. The relationship can benefit me, but cannot be replaced and still be the same relationship because the other matters primarily as a person. “Personal value and identity are bestowed on me by the fact that others consider me irreplaceable to them.”​[72]​ From here we can draw the fifth characteristic of a love-relationship: it has to be a relationship between persons. Persons are “self-conscious rational beings”, who can act freely and therefore be held responsible for their (moral) actions.​[73]​ In love I should treat other people as persons, i.e. not as means for my own benefits, but as autonomous beings. When I have a relation to something, I treat it as an object. When I am related to someone, I should treat him as a subject. When I do not consider him as a person, I treat him as an object. “Although persons are on the one hand the intentional objects of a personal attitude, they are on the other hand also the bearers of all those personal characteristics that are the necessary condition for being approached as persons.”​[74]​

2.6 Fellowship with God
When we shape our lives, we are searching for happiness. This is found in living the good life, which is to be rich and famous. Here we do not speak of money and glamour, but of human flourishing. We want to fulfill our personal identity (Brümmer uses the Platonic term ‘daimon’, our hidden potential as human being​[75]​) and so lead the good life. Being rich is thus understood as knowing and being able to realize “my individual potentiality to achieve the Good in my life.”​[76]​ But this will not be enough to satisfy my needs as a human being. I desire to be famous in the sense of being recognized and valued by other people. My personal identity needs to be confirmed and appreciated by others. And they can help me to realize this identity, since others will know it is for the best of all when I fulfill myself. They can identity themselves with me and make my good to be their own. In this way, the good of my life is also their good. To be famous consists in being confirmed and supported in my personal identity. 
However, human flourishing can only be reached when it is directed towards ultimate happiness.​[77]​ Brümmer expresses our way of achieving this highest goal as follows: “Thus as Augustine says, our ultimate happiness (frui) consists in being in the love of God.”​[78]​ Being happy is to enjoy man’s highest good. This good must be something that cannot be taken away without man’s approval. If it would be risky, we could not count on it or base our lives on it, and therefore it would be less good. So our highest good has to be something we can rely upon. I can freely choose to enter into the relationship with God, which grants me identity and value as a person. God will love me because I am who I am as a person, and not because I have certain moral qualities. My ultimate value is bestowed by the fact that God loves me. A believer claims for that reason that his identity depends decisively on fellowship with God. Would I be worthless if nobody cared about me, if nobody identified himself with me?​[79]​ No, because I would be an object if my identity depended on others only, while persons choose their own identities. Persons have to fight against and reject the identities that others bestow on them when these are not in accordance with their daimons. But God’s love means that He makes our good his concern. If my good is identical with being loved by Him, He wants to live in fellowship with me.​[80]​ For this reason He longs for His love to be returned by me. The desire for reciprocity in a fellowship is not born out of lack in God’s nature, but out of His desire to achieve good for us.​[81]​ 
The inquiry into the concept of love, as outlined above, does not only provide a model for human relationships, but is also fruitful for theology. Since God is consistent in His character and pure in His love (unlike us), there cannot be a mixture of the models for love-relationships. We have to choose one of the models which is appropriate for divine love.​[82]​ Not surprisingly, Brümmer selects the model of mutual fellowship, since it contains a relationship of two free persons and the persons are intrinsically valued because of who they are. Only on these conditions, we are respected as human beings. “The fruitfulness of personalist models for talking about God should (…) never make us deaf for the whisper that God is not like human persons!”​[83]​ Let us see in which respects this personalist model should and should not be applied to God. We list three aspects of God’s infallibility in opposite to human shortcomings, exposing how our model still whispers: it is and it is not…
	When we as humans make the other’s good our concern, we are fallible in knowledge about the other’s good, and about the right way to attain this. We are limited in our capacities to bring about this good. God, however, is almighty and all-knowing, so we can entrust ourselves to His will. Augustine’s theology of fellowship with God explains how happiness can only be attained by being loved perfectly.​[84]​ God is the only perfect one, and so we should be loved by God to live a happy life. Christian mysticism contributes here that union with God is the highest goal for human life to strive for. God’s will is the highest good for us, so we should be longing for identification with God’s will. This does not mean that the two distinctive persons – necessary for a love-relationship of mutual fellowship – are to become united and give up their autonomy or individuality!​[85]​ The union of mysticism is not by all its followers interpreted as a union of substance. On the contrary, God’s will is to be strived for, not because this is a duty but because it grants us happiness and identity. “No one can be happy who does not enjoy what is man’s chief good, nor is there anyone who enjoys this who is not happy”.​[86]​ Secondly, our will itself can be mistaken. Sometimes we experience a difference between what attracts us and what is good. Our desires might mislead us to chase what is wrong for us. Such a distortion of the will is impossible for God; He is not subjected to a struggle between what is attractive and good since He cannot but will the best.​[87]​ Thirdly, God’s character is firm and stable. “As humans, however, we are not only able to become unfaithful to each other and to our identification with each other, but the circumstances of our lives could give rise to changes in our chosen identity which make it difficult for us to continue to identify with each other.”​[88]​ [Italics M.E.] We have the choice to respond to certain events in a way that is compatible or incompatible with the identity of the other, but we cannot guarantee that we will choose the compatible way all the time. Growing apart is therefore a real option and the relationship is vulnerable. 
	With respect to God, we are the imperfect partner in the relationship of mutual fellowship. We fail to love Him under all circumstances and in good ways, so to identify ourselves with His will. This is what is called ‘sin’: alienation from God. With the help of Brümmer’s conceptual model of love, we can understand various views on atonement. Throughout church history, doctrines of atonement and redemption have been formulated in different models. For example, where Jesus Christ is held to take the punishment on Him that we actually deserved; He dies in our place. Guilt is taken away by Christ’s sacrifice on the cross and so we can approach God again freely. Brümmer analyses this model, and says: “I am replaceable for God by anybody else who is able to satisfy his honor adequately. It does not matter to him whether it is I or Christ in my stead who does so, provided that the honor is satisfied.”​[89]​ In terms of Brümmer’s model on fellowship with God, sin is not moral wrongdoing, but alienation from God. We miss the highest good for ourselves, which is the fellowship with God. Atonement can be achieved when both parties want to be reconciled with each other: the wrongdoer (man) has to show sincere penitence and the one who was harmed (God) will forgive. We are held fully responsible for our wrongdoings, a fact that implies that we are treated as free agents. We cannot earn God’s forgiveness because God is free. Earning would be the case in a relationship of contracts and agreements, but this is exactly not the kind of relation we have with God. He expresses His love freely; otherwise it would not be love. And, because God’s will presents the highest good, every sin is a disruption of this will. So every sin is a sin against God, and therefore He is able to forgive us all the sins we have performed. In human relationships this is different: you cannot forgive someone for things he has done to someone else. But every time we do not achieve the good, we sin against God, and so we can say that the atonement which Jesus Christ attained for us removes all our transgressions from us. Jesus Christ reveals the highest will of God, which is to live in a relation of fellowship with Him. In Brümmer’s words: “Christ’s suffering is not merely the paradigmatic revelation of God’s atoning forgiveness. Such a revelation is also a necessary condition for this forgiveness to achieve reconciliation.”​[90]​  Christ reveals and proves Gods love for us, so brings an end to our estrangement and ignorance. We know God, we know who God is, and we know His will because of the revelation in Jesus Christ. But forgiveness (restoration of the fellowship) can only be achieved when the offender repents, knows whom he has offended, and changes his mind.​[91]​ In the death of Christ, God thus enables us to repent and live in fellowship with Him again. Only in the light of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ we can say what it means to know the will of God. Only then we can achieve ultimate happiness, the fulfillment of our personal existence, which is to be in a reconciled, loving relationship with God. 
	
2.7 Evaluation: Brümmer’s proposal for contemporary systematic theology
Brümmer’s proposal is to speak in terms of a love-relationship when investigating the nature of the Christian faith. Theology is existential because it is concerned with the meaning of life. Our relation to the world around us is shaped by our belief-system, a conceptual framework which interacts with reality. Because we are human persons whose destiny is fulfilled when loved perfectly, God enters into a personal relationship with us. Personalist models for the God-man relationship should still be thought of as models, metaphorical in nature. God is never to be pinpointed in our models, because a model selects and filters. Even a key-model is an interpretative framework! The notion of love is analyzed in order to discover how we can think in the right categories about God. Love is therefore not an attitude within one of the persons involved, but reflects the nature of the relationship between the two. Of course, attitudes do play a role (as we have seen, I make a commitment when I love someone else) but essentially, love is a relationship. Mutual fellowship is identification with one another’s good. This bestows identity and value on us. So through God’s love, we can develop our identity and value. His love does not exclude that we have relationships with other people, for they bestow value too. But these human relations are by definition imperfect and because we fail to live perfect lives, we alienate from God. In Jesus Christ God has shown and given us the way to restore the relationship again. His highest goal is that we live in fellowship with Him.
	In this model, to be free agents is crucial. When we are not free in every aspect of the relationship, we are no longer within the model of mutual fellowship, but in the model of manipulation. This means that God can only offer us the possibility for atonement, not establish it for us. Only in freedom can we have a personal relationship with Him. At the same time we can thank only God for our ultimate happiness because He is the only one who is able to grant this to us. We cannot deserve His grace or force Him to bestow value on us but He freely gives it to us. In such a way both agents are free. This aspect is prominent in Brümmer’s theology because the model he employs is that of human love-relationships. But what if he does not take the western-European, 20th century ideas of love as point of departure, but love-relationships in other cultures? A love-relationship in African rural society would not put freedom at the centre, but harmony of the community. To be in a loving relationship with one another, does not mean to choose freely to enter, maintain, or end the bond, but to commit oneself to the other. This consideration is given because it illustrates how Brümmer wants to connect to his audience and context. His model is a way of picturing how we can understand love. Not a photograph of reality.
	I have tried to give an analysis of important cross points and pathways of Brümmer’s theology. I have discussed aspects of human relationships that provide us with helpful tools for reflecting on the relationship between God and man. This may give the impression that he makes use of a horizontal approach, which is more psychological than theological in orientation. In my view, this criticism is not justified. It is obvious that Brümmer’s ambition is to engage with believers who reflect on their relation to God. His clarifications concerning God’s purpose, distinct nature and love for humankind are helpful for thinking about human relationships in the light of our faith, and on our faith in the light of our relationships. Some critics might evaluate his proposal as too anthropomorphic. It is clear how Brümmer attempts to escape this, by continuously pointing out the differences between God and man. However, does he succeed in keeping anthropomorphism away? In my view, his model still leaves space for different ways of conceptualizing our faith. Brümmer could have developed the key-model of a Father-child relationship for God’s active involvement with the world. He did not do this because he saw the immediate danger of patriarchal systems.​[92]​ This would not have been the case if he had started from Bible verses where God’s people are often seen as His children rather than from contemporary experience with patriarchal structures. In his model of love-relationships, he limits himself in discussing only the type of love perceived in romantic love-relationships. Love is within this metaphor seen as mutual fellowship. But if one would start from another type of human love, we would rather show loyalty to someone or serving another faithfully. In that way, one might arrive at a different concept of love. What would the model of love have meant if it is had been conceptualized as a king-servant or father-child relationship? A father-child relationship includes a sense of authority and in the Christian tradition obedience to God’s will plays a role. Does such a model not portray an aspect of true love? To restrict love only for romantic relationship is indeed a very poor view on love! The model of Father-child relationship shows just as Brümmer’s model that we should keep in mind that is it a sustained and systematic metaphor. In all these cases we hear the whisper: it is and it is not! 










Over the last three decennia we can trace a renewed interest in Trinitarian theology. C. LaCugna wrote on this renaissance of the doctrine of the Trinity in an article in 1980 but since then many books on the Trinity have been published.​[94]​ If we try to formulate the issue over which they have reached the greatest degree of consensus, we should point to their enthusiasm for relationality. Instead of placing emphasis on substance and essence, they shed light on the prominence of relation. This interest is not limited to the doctrine of the Trinity or to the discipline of theology but is found everywhere in the humanities. The turn to relationality has been influenced by several developments. For theology we can distinguish two: the rediscovery of Greek Patristic theology and the emergence of postmodern philosophy. In this chapter, we will enquire in what way the rediscovery of the Greek Fathers contributed to a theology of relation.
	In the West John Zizioulas was one of the main contributors to the rediscovery of the Greek Church Fathers. His name is mentioned in this connection in many articles and books. Through these many references, I became interested in his view on the relationality of the Christian faith. What concepts does he use? How does he perceive being in communion with God? Because my present interest is in systematic theology, I will not ask whether his analysis of the Fathers is historically accurate. Instead, I will inquire what the ideas that lie behind this analysis are and how it sheds light on the relationship between God and man. Since Zizioulas is an Eastern Orthodox Christian, I will first introduce Eastern Orthodoxy, and then turn to his biography and bibliography. Afterwards I will enquire what his concept of communion with God entails and what the implications for the lives of Christian believers are. We will need to address both the doctrine of the Trinity and the field of ecclesiology in order to detect Zizioulas’ view on communion with God.  

3.2 Eastern Orthodoxy 
Christianity originated from the life and teaching of Jesus in what is nowadays called Palestine and Israel and the spreading of his message all over the Ancient Near East by his apostles. In its formative years, it searched for identity and demarcation. The Church gathered in councils where debates concerning the right worship and doctrine were held. One of the most important councils was held in Chalcedon in 451; afterwards opponents and supporters of the decisions both claimed to be genuine Christians. Both of them called themselves orthodox. In 1054 personal misunderstandings between the Pope Leo XI and Patriarch Kerularios resulted in the excommunication of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Retrospectively, scholars call this the Great Schism. Historically it is more accurate to say that the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople by the Latins in 1204 have lead to this radical division of the church.​[95]​ Western churches continued to call themselves ‘catholic’ and Eastern churches used the title ‘orthodox’ to label themselves, now in contrast to the West. Anachronistically, we say that the Eastern Orthodox Church has seceded from the Western Church in 1054. A theological point of disagreement is sometimes presented as the main cause for division (the West adding filioque to the Creed of Nicaea) but in fact political, linguistic, and personal circumstances have played a larger role. Within Eastern Christianity, we can trace three groups: the Chalcedonian orthodox, non-Chalcedonian Christians or Oriental Orthodox and the Eastern Catholics. The first adhere mostly to the ecumenical or universal patriarch of Constantinople and are settled in the countries like Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Ukraine, etc. There are churches on other continents (‘in the Diaspora’) that belong to the Chalcedonian church as well. The second are mostly located in countries of the former Byzantine Empire (like Armenia, Syria, Egypt, Ethiopia and even India). These are known as the Assyrian churches, as opposed to the Byzantine churches (the first group). The Eastern catholic churches adhere to Rome and acknowledge the Pope, historically a result of the Councils of Lyon (1274) and Ferrara-Florence (1438/1439).​[96]​ At the latter council, a union between East and West was achieved but both did not last long. Their liturgy however is fully orthodox. They accept the filioque-clause as a legitimate part of their liturgy. The Greek Orthodox Church, where Zizioulas functions as Metropolitan of Pergamom, came into being in 1833 during the nationalist struggles as an independent church and was recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1850.​[97]​ A separation between church and state as it is known in the West does not occur in the Greece Orthodox Church. Greece is the only Orthodox country which is a member of the European Union, an encouragement for dialogue between eastern orthodoxy and western theology. Eastern-orthodoxy is the official religion in Greece since 1864. The University of Athens uses western models of education and therefore proves itself to be open to the West. At the same time, the University of Thessaloniki, with its sea-port, has an even more open outlook to Western theology than that of Athens.​[98]​ 


3.3 Introducing John Zizioulas
Zizioulas is a famous contemporary voice of the Orthodox Church: scholars regard him as one of the best known theologians of the Orthodox Church today, a central figure in ecumenical debates, author of the most significant Orthodox academic theological work of the last half-century.​[99]​ John D. Zizioulas was born in 1931, and studied in Thessaloniki and Athens. At Harvard Divinity School he deepened his interest in Patristics. His dissertation on the place of the bishop in early Christianity (1965) is related to his main interest ecclesiology and was recently published in English as Eucharist, Bishop, Church: The Unity of the Church in the Divine Eucharist and the Bishop during the First Three Centuries (2001). He gained wide recognition after the publication of his first book in 1985, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church.​[100]​ This brings together articles written earlier for journals, which are not always easy to read for they presuppose specific theological knowledge. One of these articles raised a discussion in Greece due to Zizioulas’ existential-ontological rather than juridical interpretation of Christ’s death. He was professor of Systematic Theology in Edinburgh and Glasgow, and worked at universities in London (King’s College), Geneva, and Rome. In 1993, Zizioulas was elected as a member of the Academy of Athens, a sign of ‘the most prestigious academic honour’.​[101]​ He served as Secretary for Faith and Order at the World Council of Churches. His ecumenical ambitions are realised in involvement in dialogue-committees with the Roman-catholic and Anglican Church, and in his function of representative for the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople on international church bodies. In 1986 Zizioulas was called to be bishop in Greece and received the title Metropolitan of Pergamom. He has been teaching Dogmatics at the University of Thessaloniki and publishes in English, French, Romanian, German, and Greek. Although explicitly and profoundly concerned with philosophy, Zizioulas tries to connect his philosophical reflections to church practises.​[102]​ His interest in Western philosophy (Sartre, Heidegger, Lévinas) as well as theology (like Rahner, Pannenberg, Congar, A.J. and T.F. Torrance, Barth) makes his theology accessible to Western theologians; he explicitly engages himself with Western-European philosophy, issues, and language. Patristic theology is an influential strand in his oeuvre, chiefly that of the Cappadocian Fathers (St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, and St. Gregory of Nyssa) but also that of Greek Church Fathers like St. Athanasius, Origen, Irenaeus. His book Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church appeared in 2006; this is a collection of articles complemented by some newly written material. A book with lectures by Zizioulas on Dogmatics is forthcoming (T&T Clark, October 2008).
In a book on Zizioulas’ theology, D. Knight defines Zizioulas’ central concern as “human freedom and the relation of freedom and otherness.”​[103]​ He explains this by referring to Western culture where human freedom cannot be experienced when in communion with others. Other people mostly violate or threaten the freedom of man. Man searches to constitute his identity on and by himself, but fails to do so without the help of others. According to Knight, the church is for Zizioulas the place where no tension between freedom and otherness is experienced since it reflects God’s nature of diversity and communion. Knight’s view on Zizioulas’ ambitions is disputable: from Zizioulas’ published work and biography it appears that the Church rather than human freedom is his central concern. Zizioulas’ book on personhood and the church starts with: “The Church is not simply an institution. She is a “mode of being”, a way of being. The mystery of the Church (…) is deeply bound to the being of man, to the being of the world and to the very being of God.”​[104]​ The Croatian theologian M. Volf agrees on this point by stating at the beginning of his chapter on Zizioulas’ theology: “Zizioulas’ thinking focuses on the Church.”​[105]​An article from Zizioulas in Trinitarian Theology Today suggests the latter: “What gives meaning and value to existence is the person as absolute freedom.”​[106]​ But Zizioulas’ emphasis on freedom is concerned with a specific anthropology, which is constituted by Trinitarian theology and realised in the communion of the church. Furthermore, taking into account Zizioulas’ occupations, we see that his active involvement in ecumenism and the church points towards emphasis on these theological areas.​[107]​ He explores ways for a fruitful dialogue between East and West with the help of patristic (Trinitarian) theology, and at the same time develops his ecclesiology in terms of philosophical concepts like otherness, personhood, and truth as communion.​[108]​ Thus his ecclesiology is clearly related to the existence of man, as we have seen above and as I will outline later on. This does not imply that it is just another existential philosophy; Zizioulas is first concerned with the ultimate ontological reality which is the life and being of God and not with human life experiences.​[109]​ He unmistakably wishes to do anthropology in the light of his theology. But his main point of focus remains the life of the Church.
	Let us take a closer look at Zizioulas’ ecumenical ambitions. In some countries, the Orthodox Church exists as a national church, thus bound to the borders of the nation, state, culture, language, etc.​[110]​ This might result in an inward focus and low ecumenical ambitions. Zizioulas’ ecumenical ambitions are therefore relatively noteworthy. In the World Council of Churches the (Oriental and Eastern) Orthodox churches have participated from the beginning.​[111]​ The WCC is an important body which tries to establish dialogues among Christians from all over the world. Zizioulas participated in this body for several years. Zizioulas has taught in the West as well, which causes him to have a distinct view on western culture and theology. Knight writes: “John Zizioulas’ charge is that Western theology represents a flight from communion to individualism, away from other people, and even from otherness as such.”​[112]​ This is specified by Zizioulas himself in the following words: “Most of us today, when we say ‘person’ mean an individual. This goes back to St. Augustine and especially to Boethius in the fifth century AD, who defined the person as an individual nature endowed with rationality and consciousness. Throughout the entire history of Western thought the equation of person with the thinking, self-conscious individual has led to a culture in which the thinking individual has become the highest concept in anthropology.”​[113]​ He sees the West as strongly influenced by the Enlightenment and thus principally concerned with ideas, rationality, and doctrines. Because rational thinking is taken to be central and characteristic for human being, a very individual, autonomous view on man could be developed. Besides these developments in anthropology, the emphasis in theology has been backward-looking rather than forward-looking. History was the dominant theme, consequently losing sight of eschatological perspectives. The Church is based on the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit in history and leads to the vision of God as He is. It is not seen as the manifestation of the eschata anymore. The Eucharist is experienced as the remembrance of Christ’s soteriological work (i.e. anamnesis) rather than the accomplishment of an eschatological fact (i.e. epiclesis). “The West runs the risk of giving priority to Christology at the expense of pneumatology.”​[114]​ On the other hand, Orthodox theology also has some flaws. Zizioulas regards it as being in danger of taking the historical dimensions of the Gospel not seriously enough, in this manner “historically disincarnating the Church.”​[115]​ Church activity tends to be focused on liturgy, which results in poor missionary zeal.​[116]​ Zizioulas wishes to change this perspective of the Eucharist by arguing for a view in which “… history ceases to be a succession of events moving from past to present linearly, but acquires the dimension of the future, which is also a vertical dimension transforming history into charismatic-pentecostal events.”​[117]​ He offers ways for achieving a “neopatristic synthesis” which will lead both church traditions to their common roots, “in the context of the modern existential human quest.”​[118]​ Instead of striving for doctrinal or confessional agreements, “the divided communities of our time should [rather] try to recognize each other as ecclesial communities relating to God and the world through their ministries in the way that is implied in the mystery of Christ and the Spirit.”​[119]​

3.4.1 Personhood in Greek and Roman culture 
The main achievement of the Cappadocian Fathers is in Zizioulas’ perspective their revolutionary contribution to the ontology of the Trinity. This revolution is set in motion by their formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, in opposition to their context. Here, they opposed Greek and Roman contemporary philosophy (4th / 5th century CE), according to which, only what exists now and forever, has ontological status. True being can only exist in what is absolute, general, and permanent. Particular things (for instance a human being) will fade away, but the general (i.e. humankind) will remain forever and therefore can only be regarded as truly being. For the particular to exist, it needs to be part of the totality. Apart from this, it does not have any ontological status. 
In Greek philosophy, the general category is always undivided whereas multiplicity and accidental particular are seen as derivative. Personhood (‘prosopon’) is then an addition to a being: the human being has a hypostasis, a nature. The hypostases of all human beings together make up the one category of being, called the ousia. A particular hypostasis receives as temporary addition the quality of personhood. ‘Hypostasis’ is thus not identified with a person but with the nature of a person. The word prosopon was used in the theatre, denoting the mask of the actors. In the play (quickly reduced by Zizioulas to a tragedy) the actor reaches freedom from fate and can obtain a certain identity when he rebels against the necessities of his existence. The person thus comes into existence when the human being wears the mask. 
In Latin culture, the term persona is a social term and refers to the relationships one has in a certain environment. Zizioulas explains here that we can see it as role which one plays. One human being can therefore play different roles. But both Greek and Latin views do not consider personhood to be the essence of the personal being itself. “Roman thought, which is fundamentally organizational and social, concerns itself not with ontology, with the being of man, but with his relationship with others…”​[120]​ Other factors than the quality of personhood laid claim to the ontological status of a human being: the state, the social organizations, etc. Within this framework, the reality is that someone can hold very different personalities. In the Latin context, ‘hypostasis’ thus means the ousia of being (e.g. the general category) and does not refer to the particular. 
Both the Greek and Roman culture show us that human being is personal. However, in their understanding of ‘hypostasis’, the terms prosopon and persona remain “pointers towards the person”.​[121]​ The personal dimension of a human being is not his essence or true nature. At the same time, they entail that man is not really free when living his life on earth. In Greek tragedies, the person is determined by fate and has no choice besides rebellion or acceptance. In Latin society, the person’s freedom is subordinated to the organizational whole. Man is able to construct and affirm his identity here, thus to taste a kind of freedom. At the same time, the identity of a person is provided by the organizational structures. 
Certain Greek and Latin philosophical ideas have been handed over, mostly in the western theological traditions. Zizioulas distinguishes between the Western and Eastern traditions in theology.​[122]​ Augustine is most influential in formulating Greek concepts of ontology with regard to the Trinity.​[123]​ For him, the nature of God (His divinity) receives ontological status: God is one and relates as three. He has been unable to distinguish between the Greek and Biblical concepts of ontology. For Augustine, substance is ontologically primary: first there is the general (God) which produced the particulars (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit). Boethius defined a person as an individua substantia rationalis naturae (an individual substance with a rational nature), which Zizioulas sees as the classical definition of personhood for western Christianity.​[124]​ The Cappadocians kept the right interpretation of divinity and ontology. The western theological tradition has been largely shaped by the work of Augustine, which has had large effects on the way human personhood is perceived. Communion is experienced as a threat to human individuality, an idea Zizioulas tries to correct.

3.4.2 Trinitarian personhood according to the Cappadocian Fathers
The Cappadocian Fathers formulated an alternative view on personhood. The doctrine of the Trinity constituted several problems for philosophical thought: how can Christians claim that three persons form together one divine Trinity, God? How can God be Father, Son, and Holy Spirit without being three gods? Zizioulas presents the Cappadocian solution as the ontological revolution, which he summarizes by “the identification of “hypostasis” with the “person”.”​[125]​ According to the Cappadocian fathers, ‘hypostasis’ has the meaning of ‘person’. ‘Hypostasis’ in Greek and Roman culture designated the nature or essence of things. When we apply this to the doctrine of the Trinity, the hypostasis of the Trinity in Greek and Roman understanding would have been the nature of God. The three persons are ontologically derived from the one divine essence. But the Cappadocians disagree with this view: God has not one but three hypostases. Hypostasis is in the Cappadocian view equated with personhood (prosopon) and thus the person receives an ontological status. Being a person is neither an addition nor something derivative. In both these cases, Zizioulas regards the person as being a lower form of substance thus having a lower ontological status. For the Cappadocians, the person does not trace its being from a substance but constitutes the being. The particular constitutes the general category of being itself, and cannot be regarded as a lower and ontologically lesser way of being. The person is “the constitutive element (the principle or cause) of beings.”​[126]​ Here, relationality is introduced into ontology in order to make being relational. The person of the Father creates ontology in God, not the unique substance of God.​[127]​ “The being of God is a relational being; without the concept of communion it would not be possible to speak of the being of God.”​[128]​ 
This point is also confirmed in Zizioulas’ perception of truth: communion also plays a role when we claim to deal with the truth concerning God in Christian theology. Zizioulas explicitly appreciates apophatic theology (as emerging from the thought of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor) where the truth concerning God lies beyond the human mind. It transcends the division between affirmation and negation.​[129]​ We might be inclined to see this as leading to negative theology which claims that the mind is not capable of knowing God. But Zizioulas emphasises that apophatic theology should not be seen as negative theology, and does not end up in agnosticism about God. “The principal object of this [apophatic] theology is to remove the question of truth and knowledge from the domain of Greek theories of ontology in order to situate it within that of love and communion.”​[130]​ Without claiming that we are unable to know God, Zizioulas does not perceive truth as a matter of the mind and so wishes to make space for God’s inaccessibility. We are able to know Him through the ekstasis of God, which makes communion with Him possible. “The idea of ekstasis signifies that God is love, and as such He creates an immanent relationship of love outside Himself.”​[131]​ 
Two factors have played an important role in the Cappadocian development: (1) the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, which presents the world as a product of freedom rather than of ontological necessity. In ancient classical philosophy, the world was like a sculpture made by an artist. He molded the world from pre-existing material. Hence being is seen as a given instead of a gift. In Christian theology, which states the world to be created ex nihilo, the world is created by the will of God. Thus Gods free will is the cause of everything else. For Zizioulas the first person of the Trinity, the Father, is the cause of the other two: “If God exists, He exists because the Father exists, that is, He who out of love freely begets the Son and brings forth the Spirit.”​[132]​ God brings about the created things in freedom. He is able to do so since is not a general substance but a person with a will. His free will is the starting point for everything else which frees the world from ontological necessity. (2) The identification of God with God the Father. The ultimate ontological reality of God is grounded in the person of the Father, not in the divine essence. The being of the Father is generating the Son and processing the Spirit, in this manner constituting the divine substance.​[133]​ The fact that a person rather than the divine essence is the cause (Greek: archè) of the Trinity, shows that only a free person can be a true being through his communion with others. Zizioulas explains the archè or causation of God the Father not in temporal terms (then the Son and Spirit would be subordinated) but it takes place outside time. The second aspect of the archè-principle is that it is hypostatical or personal in nature. Hence, the processions are free, ontological, and motivated by love.​[134]​ 
Zizioulas asks attention for Gods inner Trinitarian being to safeguard that the three persons remain one while keeping their distinctness. We refer to the personal identities of the three hypostases when we name God in a Trinitarian way (as Father, Son or Holy Spirit). We can distinguish them by how they are, not by who they are: their personhood is relational in nature. The origins of the three differ, not their moral or natural qualities for those are common to all three. Personhood is therefore not a concept of properties (as a collection of qualities) but a way of being.​[135]​ Divine personhood does not include “individuality in the sense of an entity conceivable in itself, subject to addition and combination, a centre of consciousness and a concurrence of natural and moral properties”​[136]​ but is solely and exclusively formulated in terms of a relational mode of being. These indicate rather that we do not know how God (understood as nature / ousia) is construed but only know Him as a person (hypostasis). God is only known as the Father. 
According to the Cappadocians, we can only speak of the three of the Trinity. Would we use the word ‘God’ for the divine substance, then we would bring the divine substance to mind instead of the triune God. But God is nameable if we understand God in a personal way. His name is known in and through Christ, “which means only in and through the Father-Son relationship.”​[137]​ It is now clear that the three of the Trinity only differ from each other in origination and not in their qualities. The qualities of God can only said to be characteristics of the shared essence and therefore cannot distinguish the persons from each other. Any qualities that are ascribed to God should be ascribed to all three since their unity lies on the ontological level. For example, the Father cannot be claimed to be good as opposed to the Son or the Holy Spirit. Goodness belongs to God, so to the three persons. They are only to be distinguished by their ontological origination: the Father is cause; the Son and Spirit are caused. Thus stated, the concept of personhood has nothing to do with a definition in terms of individual qualities. Particularity is given by the relationship (“schesis”) with the others.​[138]​ So, read correctly, the doctrine of the Trinity formulated by the Cappadocian Fathers is the single source for true personhood. Personhood should not be defined in terms of individuality, centre of consciousness, natural or moral qualities, or something which is added to substance. Zizioulas defines divine and human personhood in terms of relation.

3.5 Repercussions for human personhood
As outlined above, Zizioulas’ focus on ecclesiology and his Trinitarian considerations lead to a distinct view on Christian anthropology. He rejects the Western concept of man as a rational individual, with his own psychological experience and consciousness. Instead he adopts a concept of being where relationships constitute ontology. I will examine what the consequences are for theological anthropology: “Now that we know, thanks to the Patristic theology of personhood, how God exists, we know what it means truly to exist as a particular being. As images of God we are persons, not natures.”​[139]​ Only a true concept of personhood, found in the Trinity, can serve as the source for anthropology. Of course there are differences, because human personhood is only a poor reflection of God. We will discuss these after we have seen what implications the doctrine of the Trinity has for human personhood. 
In his refutation of western-theological concepts of man, Zizioulas does not want to see human beings as rational individuals or centres of psychological consciousness.​[140]​ “On the contrary, being a person is basically different from being an individual or ‘personality’ in that the person cannot be conceived in itself as a static entity, but only as it relates to. Thus, personhood implies the ‘openness of being’, and even more than that, the ek-stasis of being, that is, the movement towards communion which leads to a transcendence of the boundaries of the ‘self’, and thus to freedom.”​[141]​ A person cannot be conceived without being in communion with others. For the construction of someone’s identity, he needs to be related to others. In a relationship of love, we are experienced as unique and irreplaceable for one another. The Greek fathers held the view that someone’s identity is created freely by love. Because we know that God exists as a person in relation, we know what it means to be a human being as imago dei. Our particular identity is thus shaped by our personality, which is constituted by our relations with others. Immortality is achieved by being in communion with someone ultimate, the Son of God, Jesus Christ.
Communion makes someone into a person but does not dismiss the person as individual substance. Zizioulas calls the change from individual to person the renewal of the biological hypostasis​[142]​ and sees it to be realised in the community of the church. At birth, man is separated from his parents and he exists in the world on his own due to his own body. The ultimate experience of this individualism is death. Birth causes necessity of being since man cannot have absolute ontological freedom if he cannot choose for or against his own existence. With reference to a dialogue in Dostoevsky’s The Possessed, Zizioulas argues for suicide as the ultimate option to establish ontological freedom: if a man wishes to deny his necessary existence, he is only able to transcend it by denying his very being.​[143]​ Thus we are caught in the necessity of ontological being. Biological existence or the biological hypostasis is a mode of human existence which is “interwoven with individuality and with death.”​[144]​ Zizioulas calls these the two passions: necessity and death. They destroy what man is supposed to be: a person. Necessity is already given at birth, for birth is the result of a natural instinct, beyond the control of the will.​[145]​ The body gives the person individuality and death, which is the natural end of human biological existence. Thus, the biological hypostasis is perceived as a “failure of nature”.​[146]​ According to Zizioulas, it needs to be freed from necessity and death, without abandoning the passions and the body. Only the passions are to be overcome, otherwise we would end up in a theology of individualist pietism or mystical ascetism.​[147]​
In the communion of the church, man can be brought to another hypostasis, another mode of being. Zizioulas calls this the ecclesial hypostasis, a mode of being which overcomes the biological hypostasis. Ecclesial man is a person and no longer an individual. Separation and death are prevailed by being in communion with the triune God. The person in his ecclesial way of being is no longer necessary in the world, but is ontologically absolutely free. His biological necessity is no longer the ruling power in his life, but the freedom that has been bestowed on him. He is not bound to necessary existence but finds his fundamental reason for being in the free will of the Father. We will elaborate on the change of man from biological to ecclesial hypostasis in section 6 of this chapter.
	As we have seen above, for Zizioulas the first person of the Trinity, the Father, is the cause of the other two and also the cause of earthly existence. He brings about creaturely existence and He is doing so out of His position of being a person rather than a general substance. His free will is the starting point for everything else, a fact that frees the world from ontological necessity. In Greek philosophy, the world is simply a given: in ancient classical philosophy, the world was like a sculpture made by an artist. He molded the world from pre-existing material. Hence being is seen as a given instead of a gift. In Christian theology, which states the world to be created ex nihilo, God creates by His will the world into being. The Cappadocian fathers claimed God the Father to be the cause of being. Thus the free will of the Father is the cause of everything else. This means that all being falls within the category of freedom. The consequence for mankind is clear: the person can now be classified into the ontological category of freedom. Furthermore, we can attribute to the particular a causal function. In biblical thought, the particular person, Adam, is seen to be the cause of every other being, by God’s will. The general is no longer evaluated as producing the particular, but the particular is constitutive for the general. For example, all members of a society are constitutive for the being of the society. Together they form the society; besides them there is no such thing as a society. We might be inclined to see the society as existing before and people adhere to it or even apart from the people. On Zizioulas’ view, a society does not produce the many members; the members constitute the society.​[148]​
Within the framework of ecclesial hypostasis, sin is understood to be a perversion of the person: sin leads to individualisation and separation. The ekstasis is destroyed, for man does not want to be in harmonious communion with others and with nature. Difference becomes separation, distance, and division.​[149]​ These can be overcome by the ecclesial hypostasis, the mode of existence within the church which is inaugurated by baptism. Thus the salvation of man is understood as the restoration of personhood in man. Through it, he can achieve his ultimate purpose again, i.e. to live as an imago dei. The problems of necessity, individuality, and death are overcome in the sacrament of baptism. The absolutely unique and unrepeatable person (constituted by its biological hypostasis) lives in communion with others and the Holy Trinity. The ekstasis of being in communion with others and with God creates particularity: identity is construed by someone’s place within the community rather than in opposition to and differentiation from other individuals.​[150]​
	In some respects, human personhood differs from divine personhood despite its realisation in the communion of the church. Zizioulas quotes Gregory of Nyssa to list the points where the analogy of the Trinity cannot be applied to human persons: 1. human mortality necessarily involves separation between the self and others. 2. Human persons can be added or taken away (by birth and death). 3. Human persons change. 4. Human persons derive from different personal causes, rather than being originated from one and the same person.​[151]​ Although man is different from God in certain ways, he should not live in division from God. God’s and man’s distinct identities are affirmed in and through the communion. This leads to the acknowledgement of otherness.  
Otherness is one of the fears of man. We are afraid of the other and of otherness in general because we associate difference with division. Others are primarily experienced as threatening our personal individuality and happiness. When we come to accept them, we do so on condition that they are in some respects like ourselves and because they can contribute to our benefit.​[152]​ If a person is only a person, however, because he relates himself to others, he cannot live without others. Without others, he would end up being an individual rather than a person. We prefer to say that he is ‘an other’ to someone rather than someone different because difference can be understood in terms of natural or moral qualities. Characterizations of personhood in terms of qualities are not to be borne in mind exclusively and primarily. The person is someone who is free from necessity and death, and is free to relate to others. In these relations, a person is ek-static, he goes out to the other and affirms the other as other.​[153]​ Diversity is not dissolved, but otherness is needed to create real personhood. The freedom that is achieved in communion is consequently not so much moral (‘I am free to make moral decisions’) but ontological: I am free to be myself. In the words of Zizioulas: “The person represents a category that presupposes unity with other persons.”​[154]​

3.6.1 Where God and man meet: personhood in communion 
Christian believers always have held the claim that man is created in the image of God. With reference to Gen. 1:27, many doctrinal statements have been made. Is the imago dei above all reflected in a free will? In being determined to live in a loving relationship to other people? Does it refer to the dominion given to man to rule the world? Or does the imago dei provide each human being with intrinsic value which forms the ground for human equality? Zizioulas does not state the issue as such, but notes: “From the fact that a human being is a member of the church, he becomes an “image of God”, he exists as God Himself exists, he takes on God’s “way of being”.”​[155]​ To live in the image of God is to be adopted as sons of God, which is to be taken into the body of Christ by Gods grace.​[156]​ Traditionally, the concept theosis (deification) is used for the goal of humankind. Man should be deified, which is sometimes understood as becoming identical to God. However, Gregory of Nyssa stated already that deification should be seen as taking on the energies of God, not his substance.​[157]​ “Living, on the other hand, according to the image of God means living in the way God exists, i.e. as an image of God’s personhood, and this would amount to ‘becoming God’. This is what the ‘theosis’ of man means in the thinking of the Greek Fathers.”​[158]​ So, to be deified does not mean to take part in the nature of God, in His substance, but to partake in His personal existence, which is realised in the church.​[159]​ To live in the image of God is to be adopted as sons of God, which is to be taken into the body of Christ by Gods grace.​[160]​ Now, important for Zizioulas is that this image of God in man is not related to ‘what’ is a human being – man can never become God. But the image of God should be reflected in the how of a person, its personhood rather than nature.​[161]​ The church is thus a way of existence where the image of God can be portrayed in close relationship to God and others. Therefore it is crucial that the church has a right faith, a correct vision on God’s being.​[162]​ The church is the place where real communion can be realized: “This way of being is not a moral attainment, something that man accomplishes. It is a way of relationship with the world, with other people and with God, an event of communion, and that is why it cannot be realized as the achievement of the individual, but only as an ecclesial fact.”​[163]​ 
	Our biological being was limited by necessity and death. The ontological nature of the person precedes the persons and binds him to natural laws. Without the necessity of biological hypostasis, man cannot exist. In order to be ontologically free, man’s hypostasis should be renewed because the biological hypostasis hinders man from becoming truly a person. It needs to be rooted in someone who is uncreated and thus not subjected to change and death. The good news of the Gospel is that Jesus Christ came to fulfil this. “He realized in history the very reality of the person and makes it the basis and “hypostasis” of the person for every man.”​[164]​ Because Christ is the same as the Son in the Trinity, he is authentically a person. In the church, the physical laws which are related to necessity do not play a role. Calling each other ‘brothers and sisters’ reveals this aspect, as well as calling God our Father while He is not our biological or necessary father. In Christ we will find our true freedom. Since we are no longer ruled by the laws of nature, we can love our neighbours out of freedom instead of being driven to love because of need or necessity.  At the same time, we do not cease to exist as physical beings. Our personal identity in the body of Christ is actualized in an eschatological tension: it is already there but not yet. Our true being will be fully realised in the eschaton: “Man appears to exist in his ecclesial identity not as that which he is but as that which is will be; the ecclesial identity is linked with eschatology, that is, with the final outcome of his existence.”​[165]​ The communion of the Church bears the earthly reflection of God’s purpose for mankind. 

3.6.2 Where God and man meet: communion in the church
The church is the body of Christ, the place where communion receives its ultimate form due to the indwelling of the Spirit and the presence of Christ. Christ has instituted the Church and the Spirit constitutes the Church through the communion with God.​[166]​ The ultimate form of communion is only to be fully achieved in the eschaton; the church still exists as an ‘already but not yet’ mode of being. We have already seen that the church is the gathering of true persons in freedom and otherness and we now turn to the practice of the Church to express this. To live in the image of Christ means to be free from individualism, separation, and death.  We are no longer ruled by creaturely existence, but live in Christ. The sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist symbolize the ontological change: “The transcendence of the ontological necessity and exclusiveness entailed by the biological hypostasis constitutes an experience which is offered by the Eucharist.”
	First of all, the birth of the ecclesial hypostasis is symbolized in baptism. The individual becomes a person due to his/her relation with Christ. Someone is baptized in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit and accordingly reflects the personality of the Trinity. We do not become the same as Christ, but the Father-Son relationship is applied to humanity. The change of hypostasis takes place on the ontological level: the human being is now a new being in communion with Christ and so ontologically ultimate.​[167]​ Death is no more the end of being, since the being is constituted by its relationship to God in Christ (by the Spirit). The Kingdom of God is can furthermore not be separated from the work of the Holy Spirit, which is characterized by communion. Thus, secondly, the Eucharist is seen by Zizioulas as the realization of this communion which is an event of eschatological significance because it reflects the heavenly banquet. It is not merely a sacrament but a real image (icon) of the Kingdom.​[168]​ But it is even more than a manifestation of the Kingdom: in the Eucharist there is progression towards the Kingdom. We move towards the coming of Christ.​[169]​ It reflects and points towards the heavenly banquet that we once will enjoy.
In the Eucharist, Zizioulas sees Christ as fulfilling the role of a corporate personality. Christ offers Himself for (or: in the place of) his disciples, which in the church can be understood as the believing community. The many are represented by the Servant of the Lord.​[170]​ In the communion with Christ unity is found in being His body. The prayer of Christ that they may all be one, has again an eschatological outlook: when He returns to establish God’s Kingdom, His body will be restored in unity and harmony. The words that we use in the liturgy of the Eucharist ‘This is my body’ show how the many will become one and how the church is the Body of Christ.​[171]​ The many are united in the One by means of a living communion. 
The change from biological to ecclesial hypostasis takes place on the ontological level. It results in the establishment of a true person who lives according to the image of God. The church and the Eucharist need to be understood in terms of personal existence (as a relational category).​[172]​ We might consider here whether this does not entail an over-realized eschatology: are human beings in Zizioulas’ anthropology sinful and justified at the same time? Is any tension between what is in the Eucharist of the church and what will be resolved in the eschaton? E. Russell states in his article: “Being both just and sinful at the same time that is, maintaining a balance between future and realized eschatology, prevents a strong distinction between the person prior to and during ecclesial existence.” Zizioulas explicitly tries to escape this problem by stating that the ecclesial hypostasis is eschatological in nature. It is characterized by the already and not yet… “Man appears to exist in his ecclesial identity not as that which he is but as that which he will be.”​[173]​ The concept of personhood in the church precedes the ultimate and perfect person. At the same time, Zizioulas focuses so much on the meaning of the Eucharist as an event in the liturgy of the Church, that the historical dimension (remembering the cross and resurrection of Christ) is hardly in sight.​[174]​ Zizioulas’ charge is actually to formulate a new point of focus for East and West. The extremes in emphasis on history or eschatology should then be no longer the dominant view. Thus, he offers a new explanation on the meaning of the Eucharist in order to show how this new focus should be understood. In my view, he leaves space for both the historical and the eschatological aspects of the Eucharist. While not addressing them as such, he presumes them to play a significant role in his ecclesiology. The Eucharist entails both anamnesis (remembrance) and epiclesis (invocation of the Holy Spirit with regard to the eschaton). “There is, indeed, no other experience in the Church’s life in which the synthesis of the historical with the eschatological can be realized more fully than in the Eucharist.”​[175]​
This Eucharistic ecclesiology draws heavily on the thoughts of N. Afanasiev, a modern orthodox theologian. His principle was that the church is, wherever the Eucharist is celebrated.  The church was therefore built upon the reality of the Eucharist, as Zizioulas states: “We need an ontology of communion. We need to make communion condition the very being of the Church, not the well-being but the being of it.”​[176]​ But he sees two errors in Afanasiev’s ecclesiology​[177]​: (1) for Afanasiev, the catholicity of a local community is constituted by celebrating the Eucharist with all the members, minsters, and bishops of the parish. For Zizioulas, the Eucharist is constitutive of the church’s catholicity, but not due to the presence of all members, but because of the fullness of its communal structure. The catholicity of a church is given by its identity in Christ, this is: because Christ is present in the church. (2)  In the Eucharistic ecclesiology of Afanasiev, the local community can be in itself the one, holy, Catholic Church. But Zizioulas does not want to give priority to the local church at expense of the universal church. He suggests that we see the local churches as constituting all together the church, but at the same time one congregation contains in itself the fullness of catholicity. Unity is found in the identity, not in collectivity.​[178]​

3.7 Communion of love
We have seen how the church community and the communion in the church are fundamental for the constitution of true human persons. The relation with the Triune God has ontological priority for the identity of the Christian: only in communion with God can his imago dei be realized. The communion with God is a free and living event, a gift and presence. The Holy Spirit establishes this relationship. The free will of God is that we live in loving relationships with others. All being is the realization of God’s loving will; all being depends on His loving will. Christ “represents the ultimate, unceasing will of the ecstatic love of God, who intends to lead created being into communion with His own life, to know Him and itself within this communion-event.”​[179]​ Christ is the truth, providing the real and ultimate relation with God. The Church community reflects the Trinitarian life of God in the world through loving relationships.​[180]​ The ministries in the church show that love is relational: ministries are constitutive for the koinonia of the Spirit (i.e. the church) which are relational in nature. Hence, love is mediated within the community and in the relation of the church with the world.​[181]​ For Zizioulas, love is the concept that meets the conditions for God’s relationship with His creation: it is free, personal, expressed in a relationship, and it is realized in an event of communion (thus it is not abstract but real). Love overcomes the boundaries of death and separation, since it unites man with the ultimate reality of God’s being. 
We have outlined above in what way the concept of personhood needs the ontological revolution of the Cappadocian Fathers. Personhood needs to be understood in terms of relationships, which are ontological in nature. In the same way as has counted for the concept of personhood, our concept of love needs to be redefined in relational terms. Bearing in mind how Brümmer portrays love not as an attitude but as relation, we see how this is the case for Zizioulas too: love is not a feeling or sentiment but it is the free movement towards the other person. Zizioulas refers to Maximus the Confessor as the first in the history of Christian thought who worked out an ontology of love. His contribution is characterized in opposition to Greek Platonic philosophy. “If we define love in ontological terms (i.e. as relationship creating absolute and unique identities) we must speak here of an ontology of love as replacing the ontology of ousia, i.e. we must attribute to love the role attributed to substance in classical ontology.”​[182]​ A person’s being depends on God’s free will for its existence and for its identity. The other and the relationship with the other give a person its identity. We are an inseparable part of a love-relationship from which we draw our uniqueness and identity. “As a person you exist as long as you love and are loved.”​[183]​ (Italics M.E.) God’s eternal love for us creates our personal identity that will not die. Our mortality will be overcome in communion with Him. 

3.8 Evaluation: Zizioulas’ ambition to provide the Church with a right vision on the being of God 
Human being is not characterized by individuality but by communion. Zizioulas argues for this assertion with help of the theology of the Cappadocian Fathers. He anchors his anthropology in the concept of Trinitarian personhood. Each person of the Trinity cannot exist by itself; it depends on the communion with the others. We might attribute certain works to one of the three since each of their contributions bears distinct characteristics. At the same time we need to remind ourselves of their unity.​[184]​ When we consider this Trinitarian perspective on personhood, we notice that ‘person’ is always a relational concept. This is the great ontological revolution which the Cappadocians brought about: the concept hypostasis was no longer identified with nature or essence (‘the general’), but with the person (‘the particular’). So, personhood is defined in relational terms and consequently relations receive ontological status. With regard to human beings, this implies that they can be freed from their individuality, which is controlled by the passions of necessity, death, and separation. This biological way of being is overcome when they live in communion; they become ecclesial hypostases or persons in the Cappadocian sense of the word. The Church reflects this mode of being where the passions are defeated by means of the sacrament of baptism. Communion with God is realized in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which establishes historical and eschatological dimensions of the Kingdom of God. To rephrase: with a right vision on the being of God the communion of and in the Church can be realized. I would like to highlight some of Zizioulas’ theological convictions and ask myself what their implications are. What price is paid when we adopt his theological views?
	First of all, in his article on Zizioulas’ theology, P. Cumin points out that there is a tension between the theoretical relational priority and the practical individualist priority. As we have seen, Zizioulas claims to be primarily concerned with relations within the Trinity. This should form the main point of analogy between divine and human persons. However, the importance of God the Father as individual and free agent cannot be overlooked: “If God’s being is not caused by a Person, it is not a free being.”​[185]​ Thus with Cumin we ask ourselves what the relation is between the particularity of the Father and the relations with the Son and Spirit: “Most of Zizioulas’s contemporary beneficiaries have capitalized on the importance of relation for conceptualizing divine and human persons, yet when Zizioulas himself comes to tell how it is that the Father is the single primordial Person, his explanation has distinctly autonomous overtones. The Father, for Zizioulas, is ultimately defined in terms of his freedom from necessity, and only subsequently in terms of his communion with the Son and Spirit.” The same can be remarked with reference to human personhood: Zizioulas searches to define human personhood in terms of personal freedom and particularity. The realization of personhood takes place in the communion of the Church. Cumin’s remark needs to be placed in this framework: communion is Zizioulas’ overarching category, wherein the particular receives its place. At the end, the communion serves the interests of the individual. Cumin seems to suspect Zizioulas from a hidden individualist agenda, but in my considerations this cannot be charged. At the same time, Zizioulas does not address the relation between his emphasis on the particular and on the communal. The tension observed should be considered. Thus, Cumin’s critique should be toned down but not neglected.   
	Secondly, the strong distinction between biological and ecclesial hypostasis comes to a climax in the following lines of Zizioulas: “Theology cannot help but develop a very high view of man. Man cannot be defined as simul iustus et peccator, much as this might be true as a psychological experience. Anthropology in the light of Christology moves beyond the dialectic of the fallen human state.”​[186]​ The being of man is thus already changed when a human being lives in communion with Christ. Russell accuses Zizioulas of holding an over-realized eschatology: “Zizioulas understands salvation as an ontological event in which the human being is constituted into a person. A consequence of this is that it is not possible to maintain a tension between realized and future eschatology.”​[187]​ Or, otherwise stated, what remains to be changed and fulfilled for the ecclesial hypostasis that exists in the communion of the Church? Man cannot become a person gradually in this view. Man is a person once he is baptized. The eschatological movement that takes place during the celebration of the Eucharist can therefore not involve the development of human being into personhood. The Eucharist is rather the practice of human personhood in accordance with divine personhood. So a real movement of being towards the eschaton does not receive enough space in Zizioulas’ theology. Finally, true personhood seems only to exist within the Church. But within the Church relations can be distorted, broken, or deficient. Relationality is assumed to be Zizioulas does not deal with this problem, for he assumes relations in the community of the Church to be reflections of the divine, Trinitarian relationships. The quality of these relations is therefore not an issue; only the originations are discussed. Even so, our identity is construed by relations to others who might not be viewed as persons in Zizioulas’ terminology. We can have relations with human beings outside the church community, but what is the nature of this relationship? Zizioulas does not engage this subject. This leads in my opinion to an underestimating of the reality of this world, which is affected by sin. Zizioulas perceives sin as the perversion of personhood and I agree with him on this point. However, this is too narrow because sin has more effects and consequences than he bears into mind. Sin also affects the way in which we understand reality and the structures of reality. Can suffering be brought back to a distortion of personhood?   
The same distinction between biological and ecclesial has another side, which brings me to my third point: in Zizioulas’ view, the biological hypostasis needs to be overcome by the ecclesial hypostasis. The biological hypostasis is tragic and thus needs a change in “the constitutional make-up.”​[188]​ Man needs to be free from natural existence, which means that his biological mode of being should cease to be a bearer of death, separation, and necessity. In the way the ecclesial hypostasis is understood, we trace a tendency towards underestimating human physicality. Zizioulas tries to avoid this tendency, for instance by referring to the incarnation and resurrection: “There is no greater proof of the sanctity and ontological significance of the body in the Christian faith.” However, in the whole line of his argument do not take this statement serious. I would suggest to use the concept of transformation of the biological hypostasis: within the psychical and biological mode of being comes the reality of Gods Kingdom, which fulfils human existence. In this way, creation is taken fully serious without neglecting the shortcomings, suffering, and sin. 







4. Analysis of pivotal concepts

4.1 Introduction
So far we have discussed two different views on the relationship between God and man. Vincent Brümmer offered us the definition of love-relationship in terms of mutual fellowship. John Zizioulas spoke of the communion between persons of the Trinity which is reflected in the community and communion of the Church. In Chapter 1 we have said that our goal is to compare both theologians’ view on the relation between God and man, and to see if we can develop a fruitful integration of their perspectives on individuality and community. In the present chapter, I wish to give an in-depth analysis of three pivotal concepts. By reading and researching we have already come across several central theological themes of Brümmer and Zizioulas. In the previous chapters, I have given a general examination of their theologies. Here I discuss in depth what they both mean with (1) personhood, (2) trinity, and (3) relationality. I have selected these three concepts because the understanding of the relationship between God and man depends largely on them. In this way, we will arrive at a more thorough-going understanding of the two alternatives, their strengths and weaknesses. In the next chapter, I will discuss and balance the two perspectives.
At this stage, it is important to bear in mind that we are addressing the theology of two very different theologians who come from and speak to other contexts. Brümmer is a systematic theologian who wants to engage with his postmodern and multi-religious environment. The relationship between science and faith and dialogues between the religions, are both topicalities in Western European society. His ambition is to offer proposals for Christians to understand their doctrines in a relational way. Zizioulas is a Greek-Orthodox metropolitan who, before becoming a bishop, taught Dogmatics at various European universities. He explores ways to bring together Western and Eastern Christianity and thus engages himself in ecumenical dialogue. He offers a relational understanding of the Church and the Trinity, which are both drawn from a reading of the Cappadocian Fathers. We need to take these differences into account when we try to set up a dialogue between their theologies. Moreover, they do not engage with each other and they may not even know each other’s theological views; at least, they do not refer to each other’s work. The comparisons that I bring about are therefore mine and not theirs.

4.2.1 Personhood according to Brümmer and Zizioulas
With regard to the concept of personhood, Brümmer only applies this in a qualified sense to God. God can be perceived analogically as a person.​[189]​ For example, it is clear that God has not got a physical body, which is a condition for human personhood. For Zizioulas, divine personhood supplies the model and ideal for human personhood. 
According to Brümmer, a person needs to be a free agent.​[190]​ Both parties in a personal relationship have to be autonomous. Freedom to decide whether to enter and maintain a relationship is fundamental. One can only participate in personal relationships when one is a person. These relations can be characterized by contractual agreement or mutual fellowship. Both parties need to be autonomous. In his book Atonement, Christology, and the Trinity we read what constitutes a person in his view: (1) I am a person in so far as others treat me as a person. Others need to treat me as a subject instead of an object. In personal relationships of mutual fellowship, I need to be valued according to my intrinsic value, as I have explained in section 2.5. (2) Someone can only be treated as a person in so far as he has certain characteristics. Only free and conscious actors can be approached as persons. They have to be accountable and responsible for their actions. They need to make their decisions on the basis of the rational capacities of reflection and moral judgement.​[191]​ Hence, according to Brümmer, only when a being is treated as a person because he has certain characteristics, can he enter into a personal relationship of love. For mutual fellowship one needs two persons. 
Brümmer perceives mutual fellowship primarily in terms of a relationship between two lovers. He often uses analyses of the relationship between two lovers to illustrate a certain point. Love relationships are also possible between friends, parents and their children, human beings and God as well as between sexual partners.​[192]​ Romantic love could have been an adequate label for Brümmer’s model if it were not the case that this is already a term for one of the attitudes of love that he distinguishes.​[193]​ And as we have read, Brümmer explicitly rejects such a perception of love since it refers to an attitude of an individual rather than to a relationship. This love-relation is primarily a relationship between two individual persons.​[194]​ Do we lose sight here of the importance of communities and their relevance for the identity of a person? Brümmer replies: No, for the community is constituted by the love of the individual believers. Each of them lives in the light of mutual fellowship with God and by sharing in this love; they are bound together in enjoying God’s love. Furthermore, the community functions as a channel of His love amongst her members. It hands down the tradition of faith and love of God through its predecessors. This is clearly experienced within the practice of corporate petitionary prayer: praying within the community creates a bond of fellowship. When more people pray for a case, it does not become more likely that something will happen or change. But the prayer can be effective in the sense that more people are enlisted “in the realization of God’s will.”​[195]​ They are freed from their isolation and lifted up to the level of God’s Kingdom where they co-operate in the love of God. So, the community does play a role in the relationship between individuals. However, these are only subordinate aspects of a certain practice. The relationship itself is constituted by two individuals, where the analogy of two lovers supplies us with an adequate model. 
Similar lines can be traced with regard to someone’s identity: personal identity is in Brümmer’s eyes construed when someone realizes his personal daimon. These are the hidden capacities that need to be actualised for a person to reach his ideal of the good life. Other people also play a role in fulfilling this goal, positively or negatively. They can help you to live in accordance with your personal daimon but they can also violate your personal identity. Others can acknowledge me as a person (thus meet a condition for my personhood) and they can help me in fulfilling my daimon. In relationships of mutual fellowship, others make my interest their own by identifying themselves with me. Moreover, it is in their interest to help me fulfil my potential. My good is their good (which will contribute to the goodness of the world).​[196]​ 
At the same time, the daimon of a person exists as potentiality. To the extent that my daimon is actualised, I realise and know who I am. We all have the task and responsibility to realize our true self. The degree in which we succeed in doing so corresponds with our degree of happiness.​[197]​ But because we are all fallible, it is difficult to actualise our daimon. We are not always willing or able to fulfil our personal identity. We experience a tension between the actual and potential self. A similar kind of tension can be traced in Zizioulas’ anthropological views. The actual person is not yet the person who he is supposed to be. Brümmer would say that we do not actualise our daimon because the conditions are not optimal; Zizioulas would say that we do not live as full ecclesial beings, because the eschaton is yet to come. The biological hypostasis has been renewed by the ecclesial hypostasis in the ritual of baptism. The person falls now into a different ontological category (ecclesial, relational being). This new ontology is rooted in the eschaton, in the future where God’s Kingdom is realised and has its branches in the present. As Zizioulas remarks, this is an awkward situation: man has already changed from individual to person but has not reached full personhood yet. 
We cannot be content with stating only that Brümmer and Zizioulas share a theological point here: there is a difference between the idea of actualised potentiality on the one hand, and eschatological realisation on the other. In Zizioulas, we do not encounter a gap between the fallible world and the possible perfection- as is true for Brümmer- but between the present world and the Kingdom of God which is to come. Zizioulas reacts against an eschatological realisation of personhood as a biological and natural process, for such a process bears the marks of necessity and evolution. Personhood then flows out of its potential and is as such again ruled by laws of necessity. Zizioulas’ ambition is actually the opposite: to formulate a view where man is free from necessity and free to make his own decisions. A person’s eschatological realisation within the Church community leads someone to his true self, the very reflection of Trinitarian personhood. This is exercised and practiced in the feast of communion (the Eucharist) where the heavenly banquet is reflected.​[198]​ So the eschatological realisation is different in character from the actualisation of the potential daimon. The actualisation of one’s potential causes the person to select certain characteristics and to leave others “unactualised”. We are free to make this selection. 
Zizioulas has outlined that the concept of ‘person’ is primarily relational. Only a human being who is in relation with others can be considered to be a person. He wants to safeguard us from individuality and solipsism, which are the consequences of picturing a human being as a rational individual with psychological consciousness. Especially Western-European culture suffers from this idea of human being. Zizioulas offers us the alternative of relational personhood. Now, a truly human being should be a person. Because a person should be a truly human being, and a person can only be relational, relation receives an ontological status. The relations someone has with others are an essential element of his identity. The concept of personhood (the ‘what’ or ‘how’ of a person) contains the relations he has with others. It is crucial for Zizioulas to understand a true human being as bearing inherently the quality of relationships. Communion constitutes personhood.

4.2.2 Personhood and personal qualities
Now that we have inquired what defines a person for both theologians, we might wonder whether personal qualities and capacities are essential for someone’s identity.  Brümmer and Zizioulas answer this question differently and arrive at positions that will be reflected in their understandings of the doctrine of the Trinity. According to Zizioulas, capacities and identity need to be separated: one’s identity depends on the relationship with God and one’s relation constitutes ontologically what a human being is. Capacities and qualities are not unique or personal as such; everyone else can have these capacities as well. My capacities and qualities are only personal when they are connected to my hypostasis. What gives me my uniqueness, is my personhood or hypostasis. Zizioulas writes:
“In relationships of genuine love, which are the proper context for the ‘experience’ of an ontology of personhood, one does not - and should not - identify the other with help of their qualities (physical, social, moral etc.), thus rejecting or accepting the other on that basis as a unique and irreplaceable partner in a relationship that matters ontologically (on which one’s own personal identity depends). The more one loves ontologically and truly personally, the less one identifies someone as unique and irreplaceable for one’s existence on the basis of such classifiable qualities.”​[199]​ 
I wonder what he means with loving ontologically (a reflection of God’s love?), but apart from this: to Zizioulas, relationships receive more weight than personal qualities when it comes to someone’s identity. To define a person, one should not use descriptive terms, for this would not grasp one’s unique identity; one should rather make use of a description in terms of ontological relationships. I wonder how we can still acknowledge within this framework that everyone has a unique and irreplaceable identity. If identity comes from the communion with God, why are we than not all the same? To illustrate this point: imagine God as a person who holds numerous relations with human beings. He has the same love for each human being. He holds equal and homogeneous relationships with all human beings for His love is the same and does not take into account our personal qualities. When we say that such a relationship bestows our identities on us, how can it then be that we are all different? In Zizioulas’ view this communion bears the highest grade of perfection by definition; it is always good, free, and loving. 
Brümmer agrees with Zizioulas on a basic viewpoint: “‘Personhood’ is a relational concept in the sense that one can only be a person in relation to other persons.”​[200]​ Human personhood is characterized by relationality. Concerning the extent to which personal qualities or personal relationships play a role in someone’s identity, Brümmer gives more weight to the personal characteristics. His view corresponds with Zizioulas on the fact that love takes the person into sight. Love is not exclusively directed to specific outstanding characteristics of the beloved. Ultimately, I do not love you only because of certain qualities. So I will not necessarily love someone else with the same qualities that I admire. Nor will my love be over when you loose an admirable quality. Brümmer introduces here a helpful distinction between admiration and love: admiration is based on the appreciation of characteristics of the person and is based on the outcome of this appraisal. Love also contains the appraisal of qualities of the beloved but is not exclusively the result of this. He writes: “The only thing which my love excludes is that I should be indifferent to your characteristics.” It longs for a continuation of the good qualities, and tries to contribute to the protection and development of them because love is the identification of your good as mine. So the person is of most importance for Brümmer, including his characteristics. 
Zizioulas will not disagree with this statement, but when it comes to identity he does not take these characteristics into consideration. They seem to disappear when love comes into sight, while for Brümmer they form an integral part of the choice for whom to love. Zizioulas’ effort is to show that persons cannot be caught by a description of their qualities and that these do not make him into a “classifiable entity”.​[201]​ He does not want to ask the question what is a person? but rather who is a person? We cannot answer this question of ontological personhood with reference to our capacities. Instead, we need to address our relations. The ultimate relationship that grounds our being, and gives us our uniqueness and otherness, is the Father-Son relationship in which we participate through Baptism and Eucharist.​[202]​
	We have now seen that true personhood can only be established in communion with others. For Zizioulas, the human being can only receive ontological status as a person when he lives in relation with others. Community seems to be of primary interest (as the titles of his two monographs show: Being as Communion and Communion and Otherness) but he does not diminish the importance of the human being ‘an Sich’. In his work, Zizioulas explains why this emphasis does not lead to a totalitarian view on community, where space for the person itself disappears. The space for the individual is expressed in being a particular person. The particular ones together form the communion. Thus they do not dissolve in the structure of a communion. However, I wonder whether the identity of the particular person matters to Zizioulas. Do his views provide and safeguard against the risk for an egalitarian view on community? I will discuss this issue in the next chapter. The person is a particular, a feature which receives a lot of attention in Zizioulas’ work (which has repercussions for his view on church ministry and hierarchy). The background of this view will be outlined in the next sections.

4.3.1 The doctrine of the Trinity
The doctrine of the Trinity is unique for Christianity. The other monotheistic religions (Judaism and Islam) worship one God and that’s it. Christians believe Jesus to be truly God, who has revealed the Father, and has sent the Spirit who is the third person of the Trinity. The Trinitarian formula (one in being, three in number) seeks to make the mystery of God’s revelation in history and Jesus Christ communicable. This doctrine wants to safeguard the Christian from two dogmatic pitfalls: (1) believing that Jesus was only a revelation of God, but not God incarnate (for instance, adoptianism defends this view). (2) believing that we believe in three gods (tritheism). We have to keep far away from these beliefs since they undermine the very core of Christianity: that we believe in one God, who came down to earth in Jesus Christ, our Lord and Savior. But how can Christians claim to believe in one God who is three? Especially when we call these three ‘persons’! 
The diligence for dogmatic orthodoxy is only one aspect of the Trinitarian doctrine. The doctrine is not just a formulation to explain in detail what Christians believe. Nowadays, we can trace a renewed theological interest in the liturgical perspective on this doctrine. The doctrine of the Trinity is related to other areas of theology, for example interreligious dialogue, anthropology, or ecclesiology. As D. Cunningham points out: “Theologians should be concerned not merely with the words that are uttered with respect to this doctrine, nor merely with what we think while we are uttering them, but with the difference they make at various points in our lives.”​[203]​ This doctrine is founded on the Christian way of life enacted in praise and worship. Within the liturgy and doxology of the Church, the one God is known, proclaimed and worshipped as Father, Son, and Spirit.​[204]​ As such, the doctrine of the Trinity “pervades the very nature of Christian faith, life and worship.”​[205]​ We wish to keep in mind these two aspects (dogmatic and doxological) of the Trinitarian doctrine when examining the positions of Brümmer and Zizioulas.
Before addressing their Trinitarian views, I would like to shed light on important aspects of the doctrine of the Trinity. Theologians use the terms immanent and economic trinity, making a distinction between the inner life of God and the way He reveals Himself in history. We need to underline that such a distinction is only a distinction de re and not de facto: we claim that God’s revelation really shows us God. We also claim that this revelation does not show us all of God; although God reveals Himself, we do not see all of Him. The way God shows Himself to the world is not different from the way He is. In the Christian tradition, the ways of acting of the three persons of the Trinity are described as creating, saving, and inspiring (sometimes completing). The persons of the Trinity as distinct persons are known because they work differently in the world. ​[206]​ Would they not work in distinct ways, then we would have been unable to speak of three persons of the trinity. We cannot claim that only the works in the world are divided; the very make-up of the being of God has to be Trinitarian. Otherwise we would only describe the Father, Son, and Spirit according to their economic structure. But in theology, we also say something limited about the inner-trinitarian relations: the Father is the producer or maker (agennhsia), the Son is the begotten or generated (genesi"), and the Spirit is the one who proceeds from the Father (and the Son) (ekporeusi").​[207]​ We say so because this is what we know of them due to their revelation in history. The identity of each of the three is now formulated in two ways: both by their relationship to the other two and by their own properties or attributes. In the first case, the relations determine the uniqueness of one of the persons, in the second case the qualities determine their personhood. 
Personal names or titles have been given to the three distinct divine persons: Creator, Savior, and Comforter. Some theologians, who make a strong case for a relational understanding of the Trinity, suggest using different terms which express relations instead of entities. For example, D. Cunningham suggests speaking of Wellspring, and Living Water.​[208]​ Traditionally, the Three are addressed as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The first two are still relational terms but the third seems to be more substantial. Concerning the relation between immanent and economic trinity, the following scholastic clauses are often restated: opera trinitatis ad intra sunt divisa; opera ad extra sunt indivisa. The outwardly directed works of the trinity are undivided and the inwardly directed works are divided. These Latin formulations show that both unity and multiplicity within the doctrine of the Trinity need to be fully acknowledged. And they safeguard the Christian monotheistic claim and the divinity of Christ as well as the acknowledgement of the work and presence of the Holy Spirit. We are not faced merely with roles which God is playing, but with Himself in three ways. In His revelation through acts in the world, we truly engage with God.

4.3.2. Knowing God
Both Brümmer and Zizioulas acknowledge that God remains a mystery for theologians and Christians. God cannot be grasped fully. Therefore, we have to be cautious when speaking about the very being of God. We are unable to know how God works and to fathom His nature. But through revelation, which has as norm Jesus Christ, we know enough to live with Him. Brümmer deals mostly with the economic aspects of the Trinity​[209]​ and thus more with the indivisa character of God’s agency. He explicitly denies that faith is like a puzzle to be solved. He holds that religious belief always has a mysterious side. Zizioulas speaks mostly about the inner being of God, i.e. the immanent trinity, and thus puts more weight on the divisa side of God’s agency. His revelations in the world, especially in the communion of the Church, show who God is. The apophasy Zizioulas refers to​[210]​, points to a rejection of the Greek concept of truth​[211]​ and recognition of revelation. We are unable to know God by human enquiry alone.​[212]​ God can be known through revelation. Let us now turn to their perspectives on the persons of the Trinity and the unity they form together. 


4.3.3 Trinity according to Brümmer and Zizioulas: These three…
For Brümmer the tres personae are the three modes of God’s agency in the world. The one God acts in three ways. The metaphor of an actor playing three different roles on the stage of human life is helpful to understand this. These theatrical masks (which reads in Latin: personae) have actually three aspects which cannot be carried over to the doctrine of the Trinity. If we fail to see this, we will end up in heretics, i.e. unorthodox Christian tenets. The first pitfall is the fact that actors do not necessarily reveal their true identity. God can therefore play roles but actually be someone else. Brümmer claims the economic trinity to be the same as the immanent trinity, which explains how Gods revelation in the world is not foreign to His being.​[213]​ Secondly, an actor ends his role when the pay has finished. But God cannot lay down His role and end the play. His role is not played for a limited time only, but God’s creating, saving, and inspiring are trustworthy. We can always count on these acts for our eternal happiness.​[214]​ Thirdly, an actor can play different roles which exclude each other. The Trinitarian roles are always compatible. One divine agent performs three different ways of acting at the same time. The persons of the Trinity are therefore not taken to be persons in the same sense as human beings can be (treated as) persons. At the same time, God in His unity is a person and He wants to live in mutual fellowship. The consequence is that it is not possible to apply Brümmer’s view on human relationships of mutual fellowship to Trinitarian relations in an unqualified way. In order to avoid the danger of tritheism, we cannot view the three as autonomous agents in relationship to each other.
	Within Brümmer’s framework, the distinctness of the three is bound to their forms of agency. One and the same actor is exercising three different roles in the sphere of human life. In his discussion of the relations with other monotheistic faiths (Judaism and Islam), he claims that the stumbling block for a dialogue is not so much the concept of God, but the idea of exclusive knowledge about God through Jesus Christ. The concept of God is thus not perceived as three persons in unity but one God in three ways. These are “essential properties or relations of the one Divine primary substance.”​[215]​ From this position, Brümmer can focus on Jesus as the point of divergence with other religions, since the concept of God is the same in monotheistic religions (one person or actor). It follows that exclusivist claims about revelation through Christ alone cannot be held. 

Zizioulas’ primary horizon is not that of interreligious dialogue. His aim is to seek ways for uniting Eastern and Western Christianity. The doctrine of the Trinity gives us the keys for a universal and proper understanding of the Church and of human persons. This doctrine is therefore very fundamental and essential with regard to the concept of God. God is three persons in communion rather than one God who is acting in three different ways towards us. The understanding of the trinity lies much more in the inner life and the being of God than in the ways He is related to the world. Such a view on the immanent trinity raises of course more difficulties for dialogue with Jews and Muslims. These religions hold a different view on monotheism. Even when Christians claim to be monotheistic, their concept of God is already colored by their Trinitarian understanding. 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, Zizioulas redefines the concept of Trinitarian personhood with reference to the Cappadocian Fathers. The three are named according to their relationship with others (their specific schesis). Much priority is given to explaining in detail the position of God the Father. Zizioulas aims to explain why a generic idea of God is inadequate for the Christian tradition. Not the divine substance of God, but the Father is said to be the cause of the Son and Spirit; he is the ontological principle who brings forth the other persons.​[216]​ He is the ontological basis whence the divine nature springs. The divine monarchia refers to this position of the Father: He causes before the beginning of time the hypostases of the Son and Spirit. He is the ontological fundament of God. Because the Father is a hypostasis (a person), He is not subject to separation and necessity. Out of freedom and love He brings forth the other two hypostases; it is His will to do so. If the divine ousia or substance had generated the Son and Spirit, then it would have been out of necessity, i.e. as a kind of emanation. The particular is in this way causative for the general category: the person of the Father generates the Trinity. The particular person is not perceived as participating in the divine nature; the particulars constitute together the nature or essence of things. Thus, the divine nature exists only by the grace of the particular persons: besides them, there is no divine essence. Communion is ontologically secondary to personhood. 
Now we have reached a complicated point: communion constitutes personhood but is at the same time secondary to it. Is the Father not in some sense dominant to the Son and Spirit? Is He not ontologically more important? The relational understanding of personhood gives counter-pressure here: the Father can only exist as Father when He is in communion with the Son and Spirit. “It is, therefore, impossible to make the Father ontologically ultimate without, at the same time, making communion primordial. When we utter the word ‘Father’ we imply his communion with the other two persons automatically.”​[217]​ 


4.3.4 Trinity according to Brümmer and Zizioulas:… are one
The unity of the three persons of the Trinity lies according to Brümmer in the personhood of God. The three divine persons are not separate entities but have the same will. Their relationship is characterized by a communion of will and thus they form one agent. They seek the same, i.e. the highest good. This places us before a difficulty: a love-relationship was held to be only possible between two autonomous, free agents. Such a relationship is not born out of necessity but out of freedom. This implies that we need two persons in order to be able to establish mutual fellowship. If we want to hold on to the monotheistic claim, we need to acknowledge that God is one agent or person, who cannot realize internal love-relationships. For this reason, Brümmer rejects the view of the Cappadocian Fathers who make use of the analogy of God as human persons (like Peter, Andrew, John, and James​[218]​) who share in the same nature. The analogy implies that God’s unity is found in the divine nature while the three persons are distinct. Brümmer calls this social trinitarianism, since it wants to see the trinity as a kind of social committee or community.​[219]​ He rejects social trinitarianism since it does not take the monotheistic claim of Christianity serious: the three are seen as autonomous entities. They are not merely distinct but separate. The social Trinitarian view seems to be attractive because love relationships are by definition between two or more persons. But if we want to hold the monotheism of Christianity, we cannot defend this view. Some scholars have searched for a way out of this impasse: they perceive the Trinitarian relations as indwelling. The term perichoresis refers to this kind of mutual indwelling which constitutes unity. By their indwelling, they actually cease to exist as autonomous and distinct persons. When we follow this path, we will end up in under-appreciating the threefoldness of the trinity. Hence, social trinitarianism does not show itself to be an orthodox Christian option for the doctrine of the trinity.
Brümmer proposes to see the unity of the trinity in their agency: the three act according to the same will. He calls this Latin Trinitarian, since the Latin Church fathers started from the view that God is one particular entity with one will. There are not three divine wills, namely one of the Father, one of the Son, and one of the Spirit. So, when the three persons of the trinity share the same will, they do so because there is only one divine will. Brümmer takes the ousia or substance of God to be the person of God; this ousia is not the general quality of divinity. Their three forms of acting in the world are interconnected because one and the same Actor is at work.​[220]​ We avoid now the view of a committee-God, since God does not need to argue within Himself about what is good and how to act. If we want to take God as the person we relate to in mutual fellowship, than the three persons are the three ways in which God relates to us. They are not three persons who share the same nature. The divine will is now revealed in Jesus. As Creator God gives us the possibility to walk in the footsteps of Jesus and as Spirit he inspires us to follow this way.​[221]​ 

For Zizioulas, the unity of the trinity is constituted by their communion. Three persons (in the relational meaning of this word) together constitute one divine being. The very structure of God’s being is therefore Trinitarian. He defines this as communion-and-otherness​[222]​. This is not to be taken as a kind of tritheism, for there is only one divine being: the unity of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Three different persons co-exist and in this way constitute one being. How should we understand their unity? According to Zizioulas it is not enough to acknowledge their co-existence and their co-emergence. The Father is ontologically the cause of the others, but logically He does not have priority over the other two persons. The three persons are not derived from anything outside themselves; together they constitute the divine being. Thus, we cannot but conclude that “their unity must be sought in the very ‘fact’ of their co-emergence or co-existence, that is, in their communion: the three are one because they relate with each other.”​[223]​ The three are now made ontologically ultimate; there is not one essence to which the three need to relate or in which they participate. The relations form the ultimate ontological reality in God, for the fundamental structure of His being is Trinitarian. When we claim to believe in one God, we refer to the unity of the Father, Son, and Spirit. ​[224]​ 
	While strongly holding on to the Trinitarian structure of God’s nature, Zizioulas writes also that the Father is the ultimate reality of God. “…the Cappadocians wanted to attribute the Trinity, that is the personal otherness in God, to a person and not to an ousia or ‘tri-unity’ of some kind…”​[225]​ This is in accordance with the monotheistic claim of the biblical tradition. It also explains why we pray to God the Father and not to God the trinity: we pray to a hypostasis, a person.​[226]​ Does this not threaten the unity of the Trinity? I quote Zizioulas to show that this is not the case:
“Now, speaking to (or of) the one God – the Father – and the Holy Trinity at the same time does not involve a contradiction, because the Father denotes a particular hypostasis which is the ‘other’ while being relational, that is, inconceivable apart from his unity with the ‘other’ divine persons. The one God and the Triune God are thus conceived simultaneously, thanks not to an impersonal relationality or ‘Tri-unity’ but to a hypostasis which is both particular and relational.”​[227]​ 
The Son and Spirit are thus not subordinated to the Father, but are on equal level with Him. The Father is the ontological ground but He is not diminishing the position of the Son and Spirit, for their communion forms the very being of God. The monarchia of the Father is this not a kind of moral, temporal, or functional hierarchy, but refers to the core of God’s being. Christian monotheism is now brought into harmony with the biblical equation of God with the Father.​[228]​ We should not lay stress on the ontological integrity of each of the three persons, since this will lead to tritheism. Zizioulas’ understanding of the Trinity comes down to an ontological interpretation of relational personhood. 

4.4 Relationality
Let us now turn to our final pivotal concept under consideration. An important difference between Brümmer and Zizioulas is that the former discusses several types of relationships​[229]​ and their degree of perfection, where the latter speaks only of communion. Zizioulas implies that such a relation of communion is always a good one. As a relationship, it reflects the Trinitarian way of relating, which is characterized by love, freedom, and appreciation for otherness. Brümmer distinguishes three types of relationships which are classifications of human relationships. These are based on human life experiences: if we look around us, we can discern certain main characteristics of relations and we group them under manipulation, contracts, and fellowship. The first type is already dismissed as being an inadequate model for the relationship between God and man, because it does not portray a personal relation. Christians believe that God should be approached as a person and reveals Himself as a person, so we need a personal model for the relationship. The second relationship does not recognize intrinsic value in the other party.  This is inappropriate for a relationship with God. We want to be valued because of who we are, not because of what we do or produce. The third type is that of mutual fellowship: two persons identify themselves freely with one another. In this way, both the parties are valued intrinsically and are respected as autonomous persons. This is an adequate as a model of love between God and man. However, this relationship can be broken. Sin is the absence of true love for the partner by treating the other not as a true person, and therefore damages the (personal) relationship.​[230]​ It causes estrangement which needs to be restored. Such a process is called reconciliation or atonement. His model for relation is also only applicable to relationships where a human being is at least one of the partners; mutual fellowship can be realized between two human persons and between God and man. Brümmer does not wish to speak of the inner-trinitarian relationships, which many theologians define as a bond of love. His effort is to clarify systematically the nature of the Christian faith, i.e. the relationship between God and man.
Zizioulas aims at a proper understanding of personhood and communion. This can only be realized in the church since the church as the Body of Christ bears the reflection of God’s very nature. His nature is relational. The relations within the Church reflect therefore the divine relations and cannot be other than divine in quality. We have already seen that this has some difficult implications (is the sinner now replaced in his baptism by his new identity of a justified believer or ecclesial hypostasis?​[231]​). Furthermore, Zizioulas does not deal with the question what to think of relationships outside the church: can a relationship between two non-Christians bear the reflection of the divine hypostasis (which is characterized by freedom, love, and communion)? Can they do so without partaking in the Eucharist? Are people who are not baptised in the Church disconnected from the ecclesial way of being, or can it be that there is a gradual difference between biological and ecclesial hypostasis? Zizioulas speaks of the eschatological realisation of the ecclesial hypostasis: we exist only as ecclesial being to the extent that our final personhood is realized. My point is here that Zizioulas needs such an ontological relationality. The ontology of relationship is crucial for him to be safeguarded because otherwise God cannot be an ontological being, holding relationships of communion with the Son and the Spirit. These two also exist due to their relations. Human personhood is derived from divine personhood, and relationality in the divine being requires relationality in human personhood. Relationality is therefore used in the context of the doctrine of God, trinity, anthropology, and ecclesiology. For Brümmer the question of relational ontology does not play a role, since the formulation of personhood in terms of relationality does not have to lead to a concept of God’s personhood.​[232]​ Relationality is a term we find in the context of human life and in the definition of the nature of faith. Faith is relating oneself to God. 
	According to Brümmer, the relationship we are searching to establish with God (in order to reach our ultimate happiness and realize our personal daimon) is fundamentally different from the relationships within the trinity. We as human beings are looking for a union instead of a unity with God. The unity in God, which brings about the Trinitarian structure, was found in the unity of will among the three persons. There is only one divine will. But man and God have two wills and they can disagree. So what human beings should strive for, is a union of their will with God’s: man can practice living according to the will of God by following Jesus’ example.​[233]​ God provides man with His Spirit to empower him to live according to His will. If man’s will is directed to the same good as God’s will, than he lives more in union with God and will come closer to ultimate happiness. The Trinitarian relationships should not be conceived as a kind of union of will. This requires two or more wills which are brought into harmony. More than one will implies that there are more persons at stake, which –in the case of the Trinity- will bring us to a tritheistic view of the trinity. Therefore, Brümmer defines the inner Trinitarian relationships as unity​[234]​. Two consequences follow out of this: (1) believers do not seek to mirror this relationship in their faith-relation with God. (2) God is not understood as a being with three persons who all have a free will, which need to be brought into agreement. On the contrary, God has one sovereign will which is made known to us through his three ways of acting in the world (the Creator, Revealer, and Inspirer). 
In my view, Zizioulas’ Trinitarian analysis does not defend what Brümmer calls ‘union within God’, but Zizioulas asks us to mirror the Trinitarian relationship. “The highest form of capacity for man is to be found in the notion of imago Dei. Yet, if this notion is put in the light of personhood rather than nature, it has to be modified, for what it in fact means is not that man can become God in his ‘nature’, but can be in communion with God. The word Dei in this expression implies not a Deistic view of God but a Trinitarian one: man can himself live the event of communion which is realised in the divine life and he can do this with and for the entire creation; he is in fact made as imago Trinitatis, and this is possible for him only because of his ability to be a person.”​[235]​














In the previous chapters, we have investigated how Brümmer and Zizioulas portray the relationship between God and man. I emphasise again that a personal understanding of the relationship between God and man forms the core of the Christian faith. We have investigated how this relationship can become manifest, the meaning of the word ‘personal’, and the nature of this relationship. I have introduced the two theologians as two sides of the spectrum of relationality, with on the one extreme ‘individual’ and on the other ‘community’. I will now systematically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of both of the individual and the communal perspectives. My aim is to shed light on the nature of the encounter between God and man. This is not a mere theoretical discussion; it is connected to very practical questions, such as: if the relationship of faith is a matter of the individual believer and his God, we can ask: why should a Christian still go to church? What is the importance of this? Or, if the relationship of faith is a matter between the church and God, do we still need to pray by ourselves? We focus here on the theologies of two theologians, Brümmer and Zizioulas, in the awareness that they are not the only spokesmen for individual faith and communal faith: other theologians develop these perspectives in different ways. Afterwards, I will discuss and evaluate their views systematically. The criteria as explained in Chapter 1 will play a crucial role in this discussion. By this discussion, I wish to live up to the encouragement of Zizioulas to let Eastern and Western theological traditions meet in depth.

5.2 The case for Christian faith as a relation of mutual fellowship
By analysing the systematic theology of Vincent Brümmer, we have investigated the proposal to speak of Christian faith as a relation of mutual fellowship between a personal God and a believer. In my Introduction, I have argued for a personal understanding of Christianity because it reckons with the devotional character of Christianity. Christianity is essentially not about belief in some doctrines or attending church. The term ‘faith’ shows that trust is essential. Christianity is about trusting God and accepting His invitation to live in fellowship with Him. With help of Brümmer’s clear systematic analyses, we have outlined how this relation of fellowship should be understood. Two persons enter a relationship where they choose to identify themselves with each other. Thus, they make an effort to achieve the best for each other. In this way, they establish a relationship of love. Brümmer’s model is therefore quite helpful in articulating the nature of Christian faith. Central to Christianity is not agreeing with certain dogmas or going to heaven, but the relationship with God. This relation is an existential matter, as Brümmer explains: “Love is risky because it constitutes the self of the lover whereas agreements of rights and duties do not.”​[236]​
Another helpful point of Brümmer’s inquiry is closely related to his view on the nature of the Christian faith. When we accept the model of mutual fellowship, or amicitia dei (friendship with God), we acknowledge that human beings have the freedom to act responsibly.​[237]​ They are free to enter the relationship or to estrange from God. God is not manipulating human people into a love-relationship with Him. God grants us the freedom to realise His purpose for this world. This implies that God makes Himself vulnerable, but it does not mean that He is beyond control. He is able to react to the actions we perform (which are or are not in agreement with His will) and so He is able to find a new way in which His plans will be fulfilled. In this way, God fully respects our human freedom, which itself is a gift from God. We do not become puppets of God who involuntarily play a predisposed role. Nor are we outside of God’s control, so that He becomes the powerless spectator of everything that happens in the world. But He leaves us free to participate in the establishment of His Kingdom.​[238]​ This is important for the way we perceive prayer: in the case of petitionary prayer, we do not only sustain and strengthen our relation with God. This is the charge of those who call prayer just a therapeutic meditation technique.​[239]​ But if we allow human beings to participate in the course of history, prayer is asking God to change this world or ourselves and believing that God is able to respond to this prayer. “Christians who rely on the word of their Master, are confident that some prayer is impetratory: that God gives us some things, not only as we wish, but because we wish.”​[240]​
Moreover, Brümmer helps us to see how to interpret this relationship and the atoning work of Christ. Brümmer outlines that the atonement by Christ has been understood traditionally in three ways: in terms of recapitulation, ransom, and sacrifice.​[241]​ The first view implies that salvation is to “participate in the divine nature”  (2 Pe. 1:4).​[242]​ To establish our salvation, Christ assumed humanity into Himself. By His incarnation, Christ has divinized humanity. Brümmer’s critique of this view is that it is concerned with how we can be freed from our wrongdoings and not how we can restore the relationship with God.​[243]​ The ransom theory states that God has paid a ransom to Satan. Satan accepts Jesus in exchange for mankind, and so falls in the trap that God had set: Jesus turns out to be divine and thus saves Himself.​[244]​ Brümmer rejects this view because it does not give attention to human responsibility for evil. In terms of sacrifice, Jesus paid the price to God for our sinfulness when He died on the cross. In this way, He meets the laws of God. Brümmer does not agree with this understanding of atonement, for it suggests a framework of rights and duties. Penal substitution, the way in which Christ atones, is not aiming at restoring the relationship between God and man.​[245]​ Therefore, Brümmer proposes to speak in terms of reconciliation.​[246]​ This is essentially that “God is a God of love who seeks restorative rather than retributive justice in his relation to us.”​[247]​ Brümmer defines sin as estrangement from God. Sin has the side-effect that we loose the right knowledge about who God is and what His will is. It also means that we do not know our daimon anymore. When we repent and turn to God again, the relationship can be restored. This is possible because God has shown in Christ the tragic condition of our human existence and thus made us aware of our estrangement.​[248]​ In this way, Brümmer offers us a fruitful model for the doctrine of atonement, which speaks to our times. It is also consistent within the framework of love as a relationship and does not include inconsistencies. It meets the criteria for systematic theology.
	As a third strength of Brümmer’s analysis, I wish to point to the position of the individual believer. The believer is loved by God, which supplies him with his identity. But this identity is not fully bestowed, it is also recognized. By loving us, God recognizes value in us. The believer is according to Brümmer’s analysis not loved by God despite of His characteristics. In the Calvinistic theological tradition, this is sometimes suggested: man is unable to do any good.​[249]​ Man is sinful and in this fallen state not worthy of any love. According to Brümmer, God does not only love despite one’s faults, but also recognizes value in someone. For if I am loved by someone, and he tells me: “I love you even though you are such a wretch” I will not feel loved and valued! But if someone tells me that he loves me because I have a nice character (although it is not perfect), I will feel loved. True love will recognize value in others and precisely in this way bestows value on him/ her as a person too. Human beings are thus valued intrinsically and not because of merits (good works) or only because of God’s grace. The claim that this value is brought about by God as our Creator, does not matter for this point. Since every human being is God’s creation, we can recognize everyone as precious. This is important for ethics: if only good deeds would make a person valuable, we should love only people who acted well. Or if only God’s grace would make a person valuable, we should love only (Christian) believers (who are saved by God’s grace). On Brümmer’s view, we should love one another, because we are not fully deprived but have value - which is ultimately recognized by God.  
	To summarize, I want to distillate four points that are to be esteemed when we are considering a model for the relationship between God and man. Firstly, Christianity is about the relationship with God. This is crucial for the way we understand the nature of the Christian faith. Secondly, this relationship is personal. Believers relate to a personal God and not to an impersonal power. However, with K. Ward we have seen that the concept of person needs to be qualified it is applied to God.​[250]​ Still, we search for models of the relationship between God and man that recognize these personal aspects. Thirdly, God gives us freedom and responsibility. We are not the puppets in His hand, but the contributors to His play. Fourthly, God loves us because of who we are. No human works - whether good or bad - can enlarge or reduce God’s love for us.  

5.3 The case against Christian faith as a relation of mutual fellowship
Though the model of a personal relationship between God and man, at the individualist end of our spectrum is attractive, there is a price to be paid for it. This section will investigate the implications and presumptions of Brümmer’s model. My aim is not to show that Brümmer’s model is unfruitful, since his systematic analysis of love has clarified how God and man can be related. I wish to point at the conceptual price we pay when we accept the model of love as a relationship of mutual fellowship. 
In a book with discussions on the theology of Vincent Brümmer, G. Van den Brink and M. Sarot have suggested the model of agreements of rights and duties might be useful for grasping the Biblical notion of God’s covenant with Israel and the New Covenant that Jesus established. Brümmer evaluated the contractual relationship of rights and duties negatively because it suggests that the partner is merely of instrumental value. However, the contract should not be interpreted as an agreement that is made because the two parties actually disagree with each other or distrust the other’s commitment. A covenant can be made when parties want to formulate their responsibilities and express their commitment. However, for Brümmer the instrumental usage of the partner spoils the candidacy of contracts as a model for love-relationships. In the same way Brümmer evaluates manipulation as a deprivation of love. A concept of perfect love cannot contain contractual agreement or manipulation. Brümmer’s classification gives clarity but also obscures that in reality, agreements and manipulation do not need to conflict with love-relationships. However, is a marriage not a kind of contract which expresses faithfulness to the beloved? Is marriage now contradictory to love because it is an agreement – and agreements by definition do not value the partner intrinsically? Moreover, is it necessarily contradictory to love to cheer up the other by causal manipulation (for instance by playing lovely music)?​[251]​ These rhetorical questions show why mutual fellowship should not be used as an exclusive model for human love. The same applies, I would argue, to the relationship between God and man. For instance, God’s covenant has been made to express God’s faithfulness to His people and our alliance with God. Concluding, the model of love should not be interpreted as exclusively as Brümmer proposes. In this way, we can broaden our horizon for other ways of expressing the relationship between God and man. In section 5.6, I will elaborate on this idea.
By analysing Brümmer’s proposal of mutual fellowship, we encounter a problematic implication. We need to distinguish between the statement that “God is loving” and “God is love”. God can be a loving God when there is an object of His love. So, after He created us, God has chosen freely to be a loving God. He loves us. But: when love is a relationship of mutual identification, how can God be love when He is dependent on human beings for this love to be realised? Otherwise stated, how can God be said to be love, when we know that we as God’s partners fail over and over again in establishing and maintaining such a relationship of mutual fellowship? According to Brümmer, “God needs our love, because he is the loving God he has freely decided to be.”​[252]​ He desires us to return His love. The idea that God is dependent on us for being the kind of God He choose to be, contradicts the classical idea that God is self-sufficient (with a scholastic term: aseitas). By definition God cannot depend on anything outside Himself. Brümmer rejects this view, for the aseitas does not entail that God is “self-sufficient for the whole mode of his being.”​[253]​ In a different sense is God independent of us or the world: He does not depend on us for His existence. The necessary condition for a relationship of love is that God freely chooses to be the God of love; the sufficient condition is that we return His love. Only when those conditions are met, God is love. The same applies to God’s personhood.​[254]​ C. Schwöbel shows how this position confronts us with a problems: within this view, we can no longer claim that God is in Himself personal (a person) and love. He only becomes a person when we treat Him as a person; He only becomes love when the relationship of love is established. This creates insurmountable problems: if God’s love is not returned by us, can we still say that God is love? To call God love, needs the concept of returned love. Here, the problem is that the Christian tradition maintains that God is love even before creation and even when His creature do not return His love. Furthermore, can we pose such an ability to change in God without ending up with a view of God as changeable or even unsteady? Is this not too high a price to pay? 
Additionally, we have seen how our identity depends on the recognition that others give us. God, as a person par excellence, determines ultimately what our identity is: “to be esteemed by God secures one’s own self-esteem infinitely, and gives infinite body to one’s own sense of identity.”​[255]​ But should we allow our identity to be bestowed by a God who needs us for being a loving person? Is it reasonable to say that God can give infinite body to our sense of identity when He is fact is depending on our love – at least for a very small part?  
Methodologically, we wonder whether Brümmer has succeeded in applying his concept of ‘models’, i.e. systematically sustained metaphors. Is his model of love as mutual fellowship still sensitive to the whispering it is… and it is not?​[256]​ Brümmer examines what the implications are for claiming that God is love and the differences between man and God on this point. However, the fact that it is just this model that he selects and inquires, seems to fall out of sight. The metaphor becomes so sustained and solid, that it does not leave space for certain implications of different interpretations of love-relationships. In choosing for one of the three relational models, we are still dealing with a model. So “we should guard against making models absolute.”​[257]​ When we make them absolute, we are no longer able to acknowledge the diversity of God’s agency. For example, the relationship between God and man is biblically not only portrayed as mutual fellowship between two partners but also as the indwelling of God’s Spirit in our lives and bodies (1 Cor 6:19; 2 Tim 1:14). I quote Jansen in my own translation to conclude this point: The relationship between God and the world is not unambiguous, but colourful and varied. A coherent unity of these different aspects can impossibly be reached. ​[258]​
The conceptual price of Brümmer’s proposal suggests that this model is too narrow. This conclusion is reinforced when we turn to certain practices that are meaningful for the Christian life. In order, I will discuss the guidance of God, prayer, and baptism. I will reflect briefly on the sacrament of the Eucharist when I discuss the communal perspective. We try to show that an individualistic perspective is definitely one-sided and deficient. 
Traditionally, theologians have claimed that salvation cannot be found outside the Church: extra ecclesiam nulla salus. It is disputed how to interpret the scope of the Church exactly (the Roman-Catholic Church? Another specific denomination? Is it an institute or a fellowship of Christians? These questions are important to consider, but not relevant here.) Is the relationship with God not qualified and embedded in the relationship that God has with His people, His Church or the community of believers?​[259]​ This communal aspect is immaterial to Brümmer. If I see it correctly, the communion is important to him only in two respects. Firstly, the Church helps us to find out how we can know what God’s will and intentions are for this world. We know the will and intentions of human beings because they either tell us so, or because we know their character, or because we know how we ourselves act and by analogy we can guess what someone else’s intentions are at that moment. Even if God informed us personally about His intentions, which would be an experience like that of the prophets in the Old Testament, how would we know that it was truly God who had spoken? He answers: the tradition of faith provides us with the framework of interpretation, authorized by its cumulative experience. We can determine whether something is a revelation from God in the light of what we know of God’s character. It is by the “eyes of faith” that we interpret something as a divine revelation.​[260]​ Brümmer thus needs the communal perspective to safeguard that each of us is able to claim to speak in name of God. 
Secondly, the Christian community also receives a place within Brümmer’s analysis of prayer. Of course, to Brümmer prayer is first of all a practice of the individual. The believer realises, sustains, and restores his relationship with God. He practices fellowship with God. In heaven, prayer will be unnecessary since the fellowship with God will be complete then. In this life however, we need to practice prayer to live our lives in this way.​[261]​ The practice of prayer has an eschatological dimension because we taste already from the fellowship with God that we once will enjoy in fullness. Brümmer also states that the believer needs guidelines for prayer; he is weak and sinful, and therefore turns away from God over and over again. To keep praying, we should help ourselves with set times for praying. Brümmer does not elaborate on this point, and so we can think about two possibilities: either the believer has to do this on his own. He then takes a daily (or weekly) moment of devotion; he has the custom of praying before he takes his meal, or before he goes asleep. These moments are moments of personal relationship with God. The second possibility is that a Christian believer attends the church service. This is an act of discipline too. Or he meets with other Christians to pray together. Now the prayer is not an individual prayer, although still personal. Praying with others helps him to train the relationship with God. 
There is another interpretation of prayer which helps to see why praying is not just the business of an individual believer – an interpretation that is ignored by Brümmer. With respect to the Church, we can state that the church is a praying community. When the believer belongs to the Church, which is the Body of Christ, he is part of this community. The community has many parts and functions, as Paul’s metaphor in Romans (12:4) and 1 Corinthians (12:12ff) of the body and its parts shows. The Church as a whole follows Jesus and reflects His example on earth. It tries to serve as He did, to pray as He did, to teach and love as Jesus did. Discipleship is not primarily a command for the individual believer but for the Church. In this perspective, the believer practices and trains his fellowship with God, but this is not dependent on him individually. Even if I sometimes fail to pray – whatever the reason may be – this does not cut me off from God. The Church – of which I am part as a believer– continues to pray for the world, for her members, for creation. Moreover, is it not the community that offers guidance to the individual in how to pray? When the individual believer attempts to find out for himself how to pray, he is in fact re-inventing the wheel over and again. Of course it is valuable that prayer is personal and adequate for the personal life of the praying believer. But the Church offers, for instance in the Psalms, words for prayer. How would an individual be able to establish and maintain his relationship with God on his own? He can decide to do this out of his free will, but not on his own. The Church is necessary for the believer to live in fellowship with God.
Another argument which makes the individual perspective as interpreted by Brümmer a difficult position, arises when we reflect on the sacrament of baptism. In the Protestant tradition, there is much discussion on the practice of infant baptism or baptism after confession. It is a longstanding tradition to baptise newborn children. In more evangelical-orientated Christian congregations, baptism comes after personal confession of faith and is therefore administered to adults. In both ways, baptism is interpreted as being the entrance into a life of fellowship with God. According to Brümmer, one can only enter the love-relationship with God by free choice because only then man is a free agent. Are the parents justified to take the decision for the child to be baptised? Or it is only possible for the child to do so? If Brümmer opts for the second option, then the only legitimate beginning of the faith-relationship is baptism after conversion. In this case, the individual perspective of faith is maintained at the expense of the old Christian tradition of infant baptism. The Bible provides an example of a convert who is baptised with his whole family (Acts 16:31-34). At other places we read that due to the faith of one, someone else is saved (for example: Lk 8:50). So Brümmer’s model may be too strict here. If Brümmer opts for the first option (i.e. infant baptism), it contradicts his principle that a relationship of mutual fellowship can only be established by two free actors. If we practice infant baptism, we end up in the model of causal relationships. One of the parties (the child) is not free and therefore not respected as autonomous person. In my opinion, this is a price that Brümmer is not able to pay. His model cannot support the idea that someone is taken into the love-relationship with God without his personal approval. My objection is that Brümmer should create space for a theology of baptism that entails the notion of God’s covenant with His people. Otherwise we need to reject infant baptism. I do not wish to provide an extensive biblical theological study on this issue; for now it is enough to say that covenant theology plays a significant role both in the Old Testament and in the New Testament. It helps us to see that God does not only relate to every individual apart, but to His chosen people (to some theologians: primarily). In the history of Israel we read about a people living in fellowship with God; not about a collection of individuals who freely chose to be God’s partner.​[262]​ 
	We can now summarize the problems of the individual perspective, as we have discovered them by analyzing Brümmer. When the individual believer has priority in the relationship with God, at three areas insurmountable prices have to be paid. (1) God is made dependent on our love in order to be a loving person. For two reasons this is not acceptable: it seriously disagrees with the traditional concept of God, who says that He is love independently of us, i.e. before we exist and once we exist, when we do not return His love. It also undermines the steadfastness of His love, which has as a consequence that the foundation of our identity becomes uncertain. Methodologically, Brümmer’s model ignores the valuable aspects of other models of relationships, because the whisper it is and it is not is lost. (2) We loose sight of the importance and urgency of the Church. Why would we still need to be members of the Church when we can establish, maintain and end the relationship with God by ourselves? We do not wish to pay this price, since we have outlined in the Introduction that this leads to problems for the individual believer when it comes to the practice of his faith. (3) Related to the second: if we follow Brümmer’s model, it would not be clear how we can accept the Christian practice of infant baptism. Hence, we try to see if the communal perspective can help us to solve these problems and offer us an attractive way of perceiving the faith-relationship.

5.4 The case for the believer as a reflection of God’s Trinitarian being
The other end of our spectrum is represented by J. Zizioulas. His work asks attention for what he sees as the essentially communal structure of Christianity, which is obtained by a reflection on the Trinity. Zizioulas does not interpret personhood as a concept that describes man in separation and isolation from his surroundings. Man is not defined with reference to his rational capacities or psychological consciousness, but man is qualified by his relationships with others. I will now analyse Zizioulas’ position in the same way as I did with Brümmer’s. By balancing the arguments for and against his position, I hope to show how Zizioulas’ communal perspective is helpful.
Just like Brümmer, Zizioulas takes as point of departure a personal God. God is not an abstract concept, or someone who has power over the world, or someone who makes sure the laws of nature are reliable. God is first of all the One we can encounter in the liturgy of the Church. By being in communion with Him, human personhood finds its fulfilment. Now personhood is explained in a relational-ontological way, which implies that (1) God is not a person in the common sense of the word; His personhood lies in the fact that God is three persons. We can only assert that God is a person on the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity. However, we should not understand this as a hidden tritheistic view of God; there are three ontological relations in God, not three persons in the Western sense of this word. (2) We still relate to a personal God, rather than to three relations, because of the monarchia of the Father. He is the one principle of God, not apart from the Trinity but within the Trinity. “In praying to the Trinity, we must be praying at the same time to the one God. If the one God is not a particular hypostasis, the one God is left out of our prayer, since we can only pray to a particular hypostasis and not to ‘Triunity’ of some kind. It is not accidental that all of the early Eucharistic prayers were addressed to the Father. The gradual introduction of the Trinity into these prayers was never meant to obscure the truth that, in praying to the Trinity, we are ultimately praying to the one God, the Father.”​[263]​
 Closely related is the observation that Zizioulas makes the Trinitarian way of being fundamental for his theological speaking about man and the Church. This is commendable, since for many Christians a doctrine like that of the Trinity is merely abstract theology. Zizioulas shows us how this theology and the practice of the Christian life can be closely related. He makes God’s way of being the point of departure for anthropology and ecclesiology. As Western Post-Enlightenment theologians, we might be tempted to interpret this statement theistically, but Zizioulas’ understanding is essentially Trinitarian. Such efforts are much broader than Zizioulas’ theology; within academical theology, we can even speak of a renaissance of Trinitarian theology.​[264]​ This can be interpreted as a response to the needs of our time and place: in our present day, multi-religious context, it becomes imperative to define what distinguishes one religion from another. Trinitarian theology can be seen as an attempt to underline the distinguishing characteristic of Christianity. To place the Trinity at the core of Christianity is then contrary to a position to focus on consonance and similarities with other religions. However, I have to admit that interreligious dialogue it not at all at stake for Zizioulas. These are just implications of his view. Within the pluralist religious context, the (famous) interreligious question arises: do the three monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) believe in the same God? Can we answer it with ‘yes’ if we accept the basic Trinitarian mode of God’s being? It is an unfruitful approach to step easily over the differences in the views on God; the concept of the Trinity is indispensable for Christian theology because a strict monotheism cannot account for the divinity of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. We would loose an essential element of Christianity if we hold on to a strict monotheistic view.​[265]​ So, we cannot and should not seek to obliterate the differences between the monotheistic religions. I do not wish to speak in depth about the position of Christianity in interreligious dialogue here​[266]​, but it is necessary to realise that a personal view of God does not dissolve the theological differences between the religions. 
Zizioulas’ personal and Trinitarian understanding of God leads to two other valuable insights. Firstly, he does not define the concept of God in static terms, for instance by giving a description of His attributes (omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, etc.). According to F. LeRon Shults, this is what early modern theological projects have done: perceiving God as a rational causative substance.​[267]​ Brümmer’s theology differs from these projects in that he gives priority to a relational understanding of God as an antithesis to the classical, substantial, and static concept of God. Zizioulas takes a further step by attributing ontological status to relations, whereas for Brümmer this does not play a role. Zizioulas needs the ontological quality of relations for his Trinitarian doctrine. It enables him to maintain that God consists of three persons: there are three relations within God. These relations constitute the personhood of each of the three persons and at the same time, these relations compose the unity of the three.​[268]​ The ontology of relationality is important because of the following: when we think of relations, we usually do so by perceiving it as a quality of two substances. Two independent substances can have a relationship with each other. The relationship is now secondary, since it can only be realised when the two subjects exist. Furthermore, the relation is not of ontological quality because someone’s relations do not make up his mode of being, his hypostasis.​[269]​ For Zizioulas, the person and the human being coincide, which means that a person (characterized by relations) is the same as the human being. They cannot be conceived apart from each other. The relations are thus ontological in the sense that the relations make up the very hypostasis of a human being. The social network of a human being is constitutive for his personhood. Contrary to the received view that one’s rational capacities and psychological consciousness constitute one’s personhood, Zizioulas argues that human personhood is exclusively defined by relations.
Secondly, Zizioulas connects his Trinitarian understanding of God to a communal understanding of the Christian faith. Only with the existence of the Church can the Christian faith be properly professed and practiced. The Church is therefore not a secondary, helpful institute for the believer which he might consult in times of need. The Church is the essential means by which the Christian believes. In a time and context where the Christian community needs to strive for a rationale for its existence because of declining Church membership and attendance, it is urgent to show the specific value of the Church. This ecclesiology therefore makes sure that the church does not become merely another social community. The Church is needed to reflect God’s mode of being in the world. It is the place where true communion can be practiced; the Trinitarian God offers us the structure for this communion. True communion enables people to overcome their existential necessity and to live in ontological freedom. Human beings are no longer limited by their biological existence but live in eternal communion with God. In this way, they become persons. Ecclesial personhood reckons with human relationality: it provides us with the ultimate communion, i.e. communion with the Trinitarian God. Without the Church, we would not be able to be persons. Zizioulas’ ecclesial ambitions thus appeal to the needs of our time and context.
We have appreciated Zizioulas’ ambition to put the communal perspective first in considering the nature of the relationship with God. In philosophy, stress on communality has lead to a kind of relativism: every community can set its own criteria and determine its own truth. It is therefore impossible to make any value-judgments about other communities. I will explain why Zizioulas cannot be judged of this relativist position. Such a philosophical communal position is associated with “social constructivism”.​[270]​ Social constructivism, sometimes called merely “constructivism”, is an epistemological position within the philosophy of science. It holds that truth should be defined as agreements between people. Knowledge and truth are not discovered in the world outside us but are constructed by scientists. The community therefore will determine what truth is. From a non-metaphysical point of view, a social-constructivist will agree with the following statement: “There is, therefore, nothing in the physical world which uniquely determines the conclusions of that community.”​[271]​ According to Grenz, social constructivism embroiders on Kuhn’s perception of truth, which includes that a statement is true only within a ruling paradigm. Such a scientific paradigm constitutes the world for the researcher, thereby providing the interpretative framework for truth. Social constructivism now holds that a certain group (e.g. a scientific tradition, a society, or the Church) has (mostly implicit) appointments about what is true and what is false. As such, social constructivists react against objectivists who hold that truth is found when a statement corresponds with a state of affairs in reality.​[272]​ Usually, social constructivism results in a relativistic view on reality: we lack criteria for judging whether one community holds true convictions compared to another community. For Zizioulas, truth should be identified with communion.​[273]​ Truth is thus not so much constructed by reasoning but by communion with God. Zizioulas thus rejects the view of social constructivists, since he does not want to make truth dependent on certain agreements within a community, but on the communion with God. Hence, we do not end up in relativism, but we can claim that the Church – the place where communion is realised – holds the truth, because Christ is present.​[274]​ Ultimately, it is not the community that determines what true knowledge is, but in the communion with God it will be shown. In this way, the uniqueness of the Church is underlined, as Grenz points out too: 
“The Christian vision, a vision of God as triune and of our creation to be the imago dei, provides the transcendent basis for the human life-in-community that all belief systems in their own way and according to their own understanding seek to foster. It looks to the divine life as the basis for understanding what it means to be human persons-in-community. Just as God is a plurality-in-unity, so also to be human means to be persons-in-community. (…) The biblical vision of God at work establishing community is not merely a great idea that God devised in eternity. Instead, it is an outworking of God’s own eternal reality. As a result, the human quest for community is not misguided. At its heart it is nothing less than the quest to mirror in the midst of all creation the eternal reality of God, and thereby to be the image of God.” ​[275]​
A last observation is closely connected to this point: in the centre of Zizioulas’ theological framework, stands “the realism of the divine-human communion”​[276]​. Faith is not about discovering certain truths but about experiencing the relationship. The same is true for Brümmer’s model, and I evaluate this point positively, because it does justice to the epistemology of faith: faith is not founded in the conviction that reason can discover the truth. The trustworthiness of faith should be given in the encounter with God which is made possible by Jesus Christ and happens in the presence of the Holy Spirit.​[277]​ 
Zizioulas therefore helps us to understand in what way faith is a personal relationship with God: it is a relationship with the Father, through the Son and by the Spirit, and this is embedded in the communion of the Church. I wish to maintain these two merits, the centrality of the Trinitarian understanding of God and the importance of the Church.

5.5 The case against the believer as a reflection of God’s Trinitarian being
Zizioulas’ ecclesiology and anthropology helps us to see in what way the Trinity and the Church are important; however, his position also needs to be criticised. I will not assess the soundness of his historical scholarship, e.g. his analysis of the Cappadocian Fathers. My aim is again to calculate the conceptual price of his view by inquiring into the implications and consequences. 
In Ch. 3, we have clearly seen how Zizioulas builds on the definitions of the Cappadocian Fathers for Trinitarian personhood. This interpretation of the Trinitarian doctrine still presents a viable model for the Church’s way of existing. I have already pointed to the fact that in the contemporary religious climate of Western Europe, where belief in a personal God is not commonly accepted, such an emphasis on a personal image of God is needed to grasp an essential element of the nature of the Christian faith. The doctrine of the Trinity clearly aims at underscoring the personal character of God. God is not a field of energy or a general force whose presence we can be aware of but with whom we cannot communicate. God’s fundamental identity is not that of an intelligent designer who has brought the world into being. He is essentially a person who wants to live in a harmonious relationship with His creation. As I have stated in my Introduction, this is distinctive for the Christian faith. The way Zizioulas makes use of the Trinitarian doctrine, however, runs the risk that it leads to positions which are not in accordance with the criteria as outlined in Chapter 1. I will expound my point with the help of R. Del Colle’s article on The Triune God. ​[278]​
In Zizioulas’ work, we see how the doctrine of the Trinity comes down to communion-and-otherness. This definition of the mode of God’s being forms the point of departure for anthropology and ecclesiology. The structure of God’s being is explored to serve as a critique on Western anthropological views. As is clear from Chapter 3 and 4, the immanent Trinity forms Zizioulas’ focus: the doctrine of the Trinity is about “the very being of God”​[279]​ rather than God’s work in the world. Del Colle objects that “One should not divorce theological reflection about the triune God from God’s salvific activity and isolate it in the realm of a metaphysics of immanent Trinitarian life.”​[280]​ Why does Del Colle state that we should not deal with the immanent Trinity separately? Because the driving force for the doctrinal construction of the Trinity is soteriological. “It is the faithful attempt to represent the One known in the person of Jesus and in the life of the ecclesial community grounded as they are in the covenant history of Israel.”​[281]​ Thus, a solely immanent Trinitarian doctrine can not be established. Now Del Colle makes another relevant distinction: in the Thomistic tradition of the West, God gives the beatific vision to humankind.​[282]​ In the tradition of Gregory Palamas, who is more influential in the East, God is only known by His enhypostasized energies. These energies are the outfluxes of His essence, which itself is inaccessible, and they are known in a tripersonal way. To the former tradition, the epistemological approach to the Trinity is at stake. To the latter, ontology is the focus. Del Colle states: “It was never the case for either side that one should affirm the human comprehensibility of the divine or that the divine mystery be reduced to the revelation of God in the economy of salvation.”​[283]​ Thus, although the approaches in the East and West have resulted in different models, they entail “a very healthy apophatism” without becoming theologically agnostic.
Three principles are drawn from Del Colle’s historical overview on the Trinitarian doctrine. First, soteriology is the source for the Trinitarian discussions. God’s activity can only be known in the way He reveals these to us. In the words of the Reformers: “to know Christ is to know His benefits.”​[284]​ This implies that the economic trinity is a reflection of the immanent trinity. If we gave up this correspondence between economic and immanent Trinity, then we could no longer claim that God has revealed Himself. Here, the nature of God’s revelation is at stake, as well as His purpose for man: to receive His grace and love. Second, the three persons exist in relation to each other. The sending of the Son and the outpouring of the Spirit are related to the Father and to each other. However, our first principle safeguards us here from immanent speculations. The third principle is that the Christian understanding of the human person and ecclesial life is grounded in the very nature of God’s being. Both human and divine nature are revealed in the economy of salvation. God’s creative activity implanted human personality into the human being, thus leading to the imago dei. 
Zizioulas’ seems to hold that the ‘ecclesial way of being’ is to subsist as divine persons. We should be images of the Trinity: “he [man] is in fact made as imago Trinitatis, and this is possible for him only because of his ability to be a person.”​[285]​ His view can be compared to that of D. Cunningham: “In God, there are no individuals. And so we too are called to live lives in mutual participation, in which our relationships are not just something that we “have”, but are what constitute us as human beings. God is pure mutual participation – relation without remainder.”​[286]​ A logical consequence of this view would be a denial of biological human existence, because man should reflect the “relation without remainder” ideal of God. Zizioulas clearly escapes this spiritual mysticism by attributing an ontological status to relationships. This means that the relationship that one has with someone else, falls within the category of being rather than within the category of having. I do not merely have relationships with others; my way of being is constituted by the relations I have with others (e.g. my parents, friends, partner, God,). The same should be said about God. The personhood in the Trinity is established due to the relationships. The strength of this position is that it can give some explanation for the three distinctions we make in God. In the Christian tradition, with which we seek consonance, we have been warned to make ontological claims concerning the triune nature of God. Let me explain this point.
As I have outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, we need to be aware of the mystery that we encounter when we speak about God. He lives in an unapproachable light (1 Tim. 6:16). Or, to say it by the words of H.M. Vroom: “Such [elaborate dogmatic] explanations [on Christology and the Trinity] would have to be a sober yet fervent doctrine of God, since we do not know much about God, about his thinking and being, other than that God’s existence is a great mystery, what God is like, where he is, and how he acts: God lives in an impenetrable light.”​[287]​ Throughout the tradition, we are told to be reluctant with claims that go beyond the revelation of God in history and seek to discover God’s inner way of being. Furthermore, in agreement with the criterion of consonance with the Christian tradition, I would like to argue for a more traditional Christian way of perceiving the Triune God. This criterion of tradition is in agreement with our criterion for God’s transcendence. Therefore, I agree with Del Colle to be reticent in making ontological claims concerning God’s nature. To quote the third principle of Del Colle again: “…the nature of relation and personhood so important for a Christian understanding of the human person and of ecclesial life would then be grounded in the very nature of the divine being, both revealed in the economy of salvation and implanted in human being by virtue of God’s creative act culminating in the image of God.”​[288]​ With this viewpoint, I come close to the position of Brümmer, who limits himself to claims about the economic Trinity. I agree with his position that speculative claims about the immanent Trinity cannot form the point of departure for our theology. A relational understanding of human relationships does not require relationality in God. But Brümmer claims that the Trinity can only be understood economically, and that the three persons are in fact three ways of acting of God. This leads to some problematic consequences, for example that God is not an eternally loving person. The following argument comes from C. Schwöbel and shows why we need these immanent Trinitarian concepts (my translation- ME): Christian theology has rejected two positions as heresies: (1) subordinationism (i.e. Christ and the Spirit are not ontological one with God but lower in hierarchy) and (2) modalism (i.e. Christ and the Spirit are successive and transitory manifestations of God). Christian theology has thus declared that the relations between the Father, Son, and Spirit are intra-divine relations. They are not transitory manifestations but constitute the eternal reality of God.​[289]​ God is now the eternally loving person: we know God is loving, because He has revealed Himself in this way as Father, Son, and Spirit. We know God is love, because He has revealed Himself to us how God really is. His love which we have seen in His Son and Spirit, is not an illustration of His love but is really His love. To summarize: extensive ontological claims concerning the intra-Trinitarian structures cannot be defended. They concern the very nature of God, of which we have said that it is unapproachable. Brümmer’s position leads to uncertainty about the nature and steadfastness of God. Therefore, a middle course has been offered by Schwöbel: to take serious the immanent Trinitarian structures of which we have limited knowledge.
	Another issue I wish to discuss is Zizioulas’ evaluation of ‘communion’. As outlined in chapter 3 and 4, the concept of communion is understood in the light of intra-Trinitarian relationships. Human personhood can only be achieved when man lives in communion. Then one is free from ontological necessity, and thus is granted salvation. In this way, salvation is understood in terms of relation, ontology, and personhood. But it is not clear why man should live in relationship with God: “The goal of salvation is that the personal life which is realised in God should also be realized on the level of human existence.”​[290]​ If relations reflect the personal relations in God, then mankind can live independently from God. To state it bluntly, once God has shown us His model of relationships, we do not need Him anymore; we can do without fellowship with God, as long as we live in personal communion with others. Others are needed in order to live as person! Zizioulas’ model therefore does not show us why it is necessary for man to live in communion with God. His intra-Trinitarian relationships and our communal structures can form two independent spheres, as long as the second one is modelled after the first. But, I claim that can only evaluate the relation of the Trinity with the world as personal and not the relations within the Trinity. The inner relations within God are beyond our human mental capacities to discern in detail. Jansen writes: “However (…) each ‘mode of being’ is defined both in relation to the intra-Trinitarian relations and in relation to God’s revelation to the world, and the latter is a personal relationship.”​[291]​ R. Muller, in his Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, writes concerning the word ‘persona’: “It is equally quite certain that contemporary theological statements to the effect that the God of the Bible is a “personal” God point not to the trinity, but to the oneness of the divine will in loving relation to creatures.”​[292]​ In agreement with Jansen and Muller, I state that the concept of personal relationship should not be applied to intra-Trinitarian structures but to the relation that God has with the world and with man. 
In Zizioulas’ view, the Trinity and the created world are two spheres which are conceived apart from each other. This leads us to another important problem: for Zizioulas, human relationships within the Church are reflections of God’s relational being. Because the relationships within God are perfect in nature (loving, open to otherness, ontologically free), human relationships in the Church are also reflecting this nature. E. Russell calls this an “over-realized eschatology” in his critical assessment of Zizioulas’ relational anthropology.​[293]​ Russell objects that Zizioulas has only two categories for mankind: either one is an individual, or one is a person. It is thus hard to maintain that someone can be simul iustus et peccator. I want to apply Russell’s criticism to the notion of relationships as well: Zizioulas’ perception of relations is also characterised by an over-realized eschatology. Whereas Brümmer takes notice of estrangement, broken relationships, and the need for reconciliation, these matters are wholly absent in Zizioulas’ writings. The relationships within the Church should reflect God’s model of relationships, but for Zizioulas they automatically reflect it. This is the result of his “focusing on the continuities between divine and human personhood.”​[294]​ How can Zizioulas explain troubles within the Church when people in the Church are ontologically classified as persons, who by definition have perfect relationships? A third issue is related to the emphasis on continuities between Trinitarian personhood and human personhood. Zizioulas’ position leads to a devaluation of human createdness. He says that only the passions of death and necessity have to be overcome. But at the same time, man should receive a whole new hypostasis, a whole new ontological status. Therefore, he claims to escape from anti-physical tendencies, but in my view he does not succeed to do so satisfactorily. 
And now we can turn to our last criticism on Zizioulas: the place of the believer. Thus far, I have not discussed Zizioulas’ effort to outline how “the one and the many” relate to each other although it is an important feature in his work. To state it shortly, in God there is unity-in-diversity. There is otherness-in-communion: the three persons are different but not divided. In the Church, we also should not fear otherness, but focus on the unity of our communion. He endeavours to show that the “individual” is not lost sight of.​[295]​ Zizioulas escapes here from a collective perspective on Christian faith, where the many outshine the particular. The particular constitutes the communion. His view brings two difficulties with it: (1) the uniqueness of the divine persons is not satisfactorily highlighted. For Zizioulas, God the Father is the person par excellence, whereas Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit do not receive attention as “individual actors”. For example, Christ is the One who mediates the communion with God, rather than the One who has established reconciliation. His salvific work is not considered. This leads to two other flaws, which E. Russell summarizes as focusing on the symbol “and not on the thing signified”.​[296]​ The danger is that the “emphasis on the place of baptism in constituting the persons replaces the significance of the cross and resurrection.”​[297]​ The same criticism applies to the Eucharist. Of course, the sacraments symbolize the cross and resurrection, but the latter receive too little attention. (2) The identity of the believer is not appreciated. For Zizioulas’ model, it is more important that I am a particular person than that I have a personality of my own. Actually, people are not appreciated within the Church because of their personality but only and exclusively for their “being other”. In this way, in Zizioulas’ model of communion, the uniqueness of persons is lost sight of. Therefore it carries the risk of becoming egalitarian and collective in nature. Since personhood is only defined in terms of relationality, the qualities and characteristics of a person as such are not discussed and valued anymore. It therefore implies that within the community of the Church, I will not be loved because I am a person X but because I am a person. The attractiveness of this view lies in the fact that I do not need to establish my value by doing all kind of activities. My personal presence is already enough. However, will it be sufficient for me to hear: “You are welcome here, despite the fact that you are a miserable character”? Will I feel loved when I am loved wholly despite my characteristics? Of course not; I wish to hear that I have some valuable characteristics, which make me to the person I am. I do not merely want to be a person, but I want to be who I am. What is the value then of diversity or otherness according to Zizioulas? In his view, diversity is actually reduced to the existence of identical persons who are distinct. But diversity is more than being distinct; it is being people with different personalities. I do not merely want to be admired, loved, and appreciated because I am a distinct person but because I am myself. Because Zizioulas does not examine the discontinuities between divine and human personhood, human “individuality” receives no attention. The conceptual price of Zizioulas’ model on human personhood  is therefore too high.
	In summary, I have argued that (1) Zizioulas’ ontological claims on the immanent Trinity are not in agreement with the soteriological motivation of the doctrine of the Trinity. (2) Moreover, they are not in consonance with the Christian tradition. These claims do not reflect the apophatic tradition, which gives account of God’s transcendence. (3) Zizioulas’ perception of living in the imago dei leads to unsatisfactory approaches to the life of the believer. The creaturely dimensions are not suffieciently reckoned, as is seen from the interpretation of relational being. (3) The over-realized eschatology is not very fruitful for the practice of the Church. (4) Human persons are not adequately valued for their particular personality. Hence, the model for the relationship between God and man as reflection of God’s intra-Trinitarian relations, requests us to pay too high a price. Therefore, in the discussion I will look to the merits of the models of Brümmer and Zizioulas and try to overcome their main problems.  
  
5.6.1 A constructive proposal for conceiving the relationship between God and man
I have evaluated both the views of Brümmer and Zizioulas on perceiving Christian faith as a personal relationship between God and man. I selected Brümmer’s model as representing the individual perspective and Zizioulas’ views as representing the communal dimension of Christianity. Their approaches have shown us important insights on (1) how to understand Christian faith as a personal relation, (2) why the relationship should be free, and (3) how to understand love. Without ignoring their considerable achievements, I have assessed the conceptual prices and problems that we encounter when we choose either of these models. We do not wish to perceive the relationship between God and man in such a way that it leads to an individualist faith, or needs an appeal to a speculative immanent Trinitarian theology, and disqualifies human personality. Because these risks were present in the relational models we have discussed, I will outline a proposal to overcome these problems. We need a new perspective which makes the personal character of Christian faith the centre of our systematic theology, but not at the expense of the necessity of the communion of the church. I suggest to speak of the love-relationship between God and man with help of the notion of a covenant. Neither Brümmer, nor Zizioulas have analyzed this concept in depth. My aim is here to shed light on some aspects of this term, without pretending to provide a comprehensive alternative model. My proposal should be read as a first step towards a broader perspective on the relationship between God and man. In section 5.3, I have already hinted at the term ‘covenant’. This is a frequently used theological term, mostly in Protestant theology.​[298]​ Here, I will make clear that this notion carries a concept of relation, which does not (1) require us to choose for one of the ends of our spectrum, (2) need an immanent Trinitarian theory for grounding the relational understanding of faith, (3) neglect the importance of the church, or (4) abandon our departing point of personal faith. I will shed light on theological, ecclesiological, and anthropological dimensions. Within these sections, the three pivotal concepts of Chapter 4 will be addressed as well: personhood, Trinity, and relationality. At the end I will summarize my position and calculate the conceptual price. 

5.6.2 The metaphor of a covenant
In our discussion of Brümmer’s model of love, we have distinguished three types of human relationships: manipulation, contractual agreement, and mutual fellowship. A relationship of love was characterized by mutual identification. The other types of relationships were not suitable as models of the relationship between God and man. But in section 5.3 I have argued that we should not opt for an exclusive model for the love-relationship between God and man. I also have argued that we should not easily dismiss contractual relations as a metaphor.
For Brümmer, a relation of contractual agreement concerns the rights and duties of each of the parties involved. They both agree with the rights and duties as explained in a social contract. Such a relationship has only instrumental value and contradicts intrinsic value. But can we claim this with regard to all contractual relations? For example, we can perceive marriage as a kind of contractual agreement. Both bride and groom agree (and promise) to live in love and faithfulness with one another. But it would be odd to state that they don’t care about who signs the contract, as long as the promises and duties are regulated! The partners in a marriage do not merely seek to live together with someone else, but they desire to live with thát particular person. Because the partner gives something to me (i.g. protection, security,..), it does not become arbitrary who gives these things to me! Thus, most important is not the instrumental value but the intrinsic value of the beloved. The relationship may have instrumental value as well, but the partners are not valued instrumentally. The image of marriage is also used in the Bible to describe aspects of the relationship between God and man. A contractual agreement can thus serve as an example of a personal love-relationship. But marriage is still a metaphor which applies to two individuals. If we wish to outline a concept of the relationship between God and man where communal aspects receive a significant place, the metaphor of a covenant is helpful. 
In daily language, a covenant is an agreement of peace and friendship. It thus expresses a type of relationship. The term actually can also mean the document of the treaty (in the Bible it denotes sometimes the law or commandments) but I will not use the term in this way. A covenant is usually made in a time of war, where agreements are forged to safeguard the rights and duties of both the parties. The demands of the covenant are confirmed by a mutual promise. In the Bible, the term ‘covenant’ (Hebrew: tÞyrIB. ; Greek: diaqh,kh) describes the relationship that God gracefully initiates and confirms with humankind: God is acting in history and man is responding to these actions.​[299]​ Out of love, God makes the covenant with His people. Due to God’s grace, faithfulness, and patience, this covenant is maintained. The faithfulness, patience and perseverance of God are more central to the covenant of God and man than the rights and duties. The certainty that God will not leave us or let us down, is expressed in the notion of the covenant. It is a metaphor for the relation that God desires and realizes with man.​[300]​ Scholars point to similarities with Hittite vassal treaties. Such suzerain-vassal treaties are pacts between the overlord and vassal, which have a similar structure as Biblical covenant-documents. It could thus be that Israelite writers have borrowed well-known formulations of loyalty-treaties and used them to describe the relationship between YHWH and the people of Israel. M. Weinfeld states more generally that a covenant is mainly an obligation between unequal partners.​[301]​ One of the parties is more powerful than the other; the treaty protects and guarantees both their status. A covenant is thus a relationship between two parties (which do not need to be individuals), who freely decide to establish the covenant. They both agree to keep their promises and duties. 
A covenant can easily be misunderstood as a kind of juridical treaty. In this way, the concept of covenant is reduced to an agreement of rights and duties. The relationship becomes highly businesslike and impersonal. The partners are no longer important but only the goods received or protected. In case of a covenant between God and man, man would then accept this covenant only because he receives protection and blessings. God becomes then the instrument for safety and well-being. Van Niftrik explains that these implications of ‘covenant’ are not carried over when the Bible speaks about the covenant of God with man.​[302]​ According to him, the implications of covenant are that one of the parties (God) gives everything in this relation and one of the parties (man) receives everything. With regard to man, there is no other request than to accept in gratitude the gifts that God offers. He even goes so far as to say that the covenant is an analogy which does not imply the idea of contract. I disagree with this latter viewpoint, but Van Niftrik is right in claiming that the relation is asymmetrical. The covenant or treaty primarily expresses the faithfulness of God in relation to man. God is faithful because He loves man.
That a covenant not only entails businesslike-relations, but that it can also express the love of (one of) the partners, can be seen from the following: in terms of a covenant-relationship, a covenant is needed because one of the parties (i.e. man) is unable to maintain the relationship of love. Brümmer has said that a relationship between God and man will experience estrangement because man is not able to love and serve God as he should. I agree with Brümmer’s perspective here, that a relationship with man is of highest priority for God. Therefore, He forgives our estrangement and offers reconciliation. Analogous to a marriage-contract, a covenant expresses that the two parties have an agreement with each other. It guarantees that the two will be related as is formulated in the contract. With respect to God, the treaty expresses that God will hold on to the relationship of love, even though man is unfaithful and disobedient. The faithfulness as expressed by the covenant-relation, is motivated by God’s love for us. The metaphor of a covenant is therefore not contradictory to a love-relationship. Quite the contrary, it is a form of a love-relationship. The two parties are free to act as persons and they are valued because of who they are. Hence, we do not keep in mind the original context of a war-like situation when we want to describe the relationship between God and man. The love of God is indeed a root-metaphor for the relationship between God and man; I take the covenantal relationship as an analogy of such a love-relationship.
Also the term ‘friendship’ has been used in theology to express the covenantal relation with God. W. van Asselt writes that Cocceius, a seventeen-century German theologian, describes with ‘amicitia’ the spirituality of the covenant.​[303]​ Cocceius defines ‘covenant’ as the “pactum de amicitia consummatum”, the complete agreement of friendship. This friendship is initiated by God (whether it is characterised as a covenant of works or of grace).​[304]​ Friendship is the way in which the believer experiences the covenant with God and by which it takes shape. Why does this interpretation of friendship with God provide us with a better understanding of the relation between God and man than the concept of love as mutual fellowship? This is because the concept of a covenant does not imply that there are two single partners involved, but offers the possibility to grasp a relationship between God and a community. Man is not responding individualistically to God’s grace, but by the covenantal relationship with God, he is united with others.

5.6.3 Theological implications
Against contemporary trends to portray the community of the Church as a reflection of the triune God, the metaphor of a covenant presents the Church as the people of God. D. Cunningham discusses in what ways the doctrine of the Trinity should teach us how to relate healthily to each other. Individualism and fear of difference are opposed by this doctrine: “The doctrine of the Trinity is a challenge to the modern cult of the individual; it teaches us to think in terms of complex webs of mutuality and participation. The practice of Trinitarian theology thus calls us into newness of life – a life that bears a very different shape from what we have come to regard as “ordinary” existence.”​[305]​ A reconsidering of Trinitarian doctrine functions as a charge against the Western European culture of individualism and fear of homogeneity when opting for communal perspectives.​[306]​ Or, to quote S. Grenz: “The Christian vision, a vision of God as triune and of our creation to be the imago dei, provides the transcendent basis for the human life-in-community that all belief systems in their own way and according to their own understanding seek to foster. It looks to the divine life as the basis for understanding what it means to be human persons-in-community. Just as God is a plurality-in-unity, so also to be human means to be persons-in-community. (…) (t)he biblical vision of God at work establishing community is not merely a great idea that God devised in eternity. Instead, it is an outworking of God’s own eternal reality. As a result, the human quest for community is not misguided. At its heart it is nothing less than the quest to mirror in the midst of all creation the eternal reality of God, and thereby to be the image of God.”​[307]​ When we portray the Church as a gathering of people who relate to God, we do not need such a use of Trinitarian theology. The Trinity could then be understood as a way of perceiving God’s agency in the world rather than a foundation for theological anthropology. We live in relationship of love to a personal God. He chooses freely to love us and to be faithful to us. Hence, we relate to a personal God rather than to three personal and ontological entities. 
We have said that intra-Trinitarian relations can only be described in so far as they are connected to salvation history. But how do we then perceive the Trinity when we opt for a covenantal-relationship? For the present argument it is enough to state that God has revealed to us in three ways how He wants to relate to us: as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. I therefore claim that a relational understanding of the three Trinitarian persons is not causally related to an understanding of human personhood. This does not mean that human personhood is not relational; it is just not tied to a certain understanding of Trinitarian personhood. In Zizioulas’ model, an ontology of relations is needed to explain why the three divine persons are existent in reality and not merely constructions of the human mind. For Zizioulas, the three persons are relational in essence, but when relation is not ontological, the three cannot be interpreted as being real persons. I reject the view that the relationship between the understanding of divine and human personhood is causal. The ontological interpretation of relationships can then be abandoned without paying a conceptual price. The Trinity is important in the history of God’s involvement with His people. 
As said, abandoning a causal understanding between divine and human relationality, does not mean that relationality has nothing to do with ontology: relations are the most important factor in building a personal identity. Relations do not only cause me to receive a certain identity. Relationships also form a part of my identity: I am the daughter of my parents, I am the fiancée of my boyfriend, and I am a friend to my friends. It is helpful to make a distinction here between essential or internal and external relations.​[308]​ The former are essential for the person to be what he is, whereas the latter is not. So, I claim that no relations have an ontological status. Only internal relations have ontological implications. External relations do not have ontological implications at all. The same applies to the concept of love: love is not ontological itself​[309]​, but it is a relationship and therefore has an ontological function. It makes us who we are. 

5.6.4 Ecclesiological implications
In the Bible, a covenant is not only made between God and individual man, but also between God and His people. This does not mean that man is involuntarily included in the covenant, but it means that the concept of a ‘covenantal relationship’ is not exclusively individual. We form together the ally or partner of God. This communal dimension is eminent in the Bible. In the Old Testament as the beloved people of Israel, in the New Testament as the church.​[310]​ The Greek term of the New Testament for the community is ekklesia. A gathering of people is the ekklesia. They are characterised by fellowship or koinonia.​[311]​ In a very practical way, the community was realized. A metaphor for the community of Christians is the ‘Body of Christ’. All Christians together strive to be disciples of Christ. They make Him present in the world; individually they enter the relationship with God - which is only possible because God is merciful and faithful. Believers are then part of the community. When they celebrate the Eucharist, the meal serves as a symbol with three temporal aspects: (1) it is a deed of remembrance. While celebrating the Lord’s Supper, we remember how Jesus Christ has given His life for us and how much it cost to renew the covenantal relationship. (2) During the Eucharist, we are in the presence of God. As God’s people, who are called to live in His image, we are united with God’s reality (in the sense that Brümmer explains: union, not unity). The universal church celebrates this meal. (3) The meal has an eschatological outlook: once we will live our lives in the fullness of God’s presence, when His Kingdom is achieved. We endeavour to become the worthy ally of God.
Baptism symbolizes the beginning of the covenantal relationship with God. It is a sign of God’s faithfulness and love for us. At baptism, God does not change His intention to live in fellowship with us, but this intention is realized. Baptism expresses the faithfulness of God which we have understood analogically as covenant. As a symbol, it refers to the love and grace of God. At the same time, it is an expression of our response to this faithfulness. The two parties in this relationship are involved as the two agents: God, who is known by Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit, and man. It is important to explicate that man does not become passive in the relationship of a covenant. Within the covenant, man accepts the faithful love of God. Out of this covenantal love-relationship, man is required to live according to the will of God, to be a disciple of Christ. But again, this is not the task for man by himself; it is the command to man in a community.

5.6.5 Anthropological implications
The covenant between God and man contains the idea that we not only relate as individuals but also as a community to God. What does this mean for our human existence? First of all, when someone is taken in into the covenant of God, he is respected as a person. One is free to accept or reject the offer. The relationship of a covenant is a metaphor for a personal relation. Secondly, the covenantal-relationship is foremost an expression of love. It has no other objective than to be an end in itself. Hence, one is loved by God intrinsically: we are not loved because God wants to glorify himself, but because He wants us to live in relationship with Him. As we have seen from Schwöbel’s critique on Brümmer, this means that God becomes personal and loving when we answer His love. Thus He is dependent on us for significant characteristics of His identity. As the metaphor of the covenant shows, God’s preponderance is emphasised. Although we cannot say that God is love in Himself - God still needs a partner in order to be love -, the concept of ‘covenant’ makes a strong case for the steadfastness and trustworthiness of God. Therefore, we are justified to “take the risk” and live as His ally. 
Within the covenant, three things are involved: (1) the presence of the Spirit, (2) the communication of grace, and (3) the ties with the community. To the first one, we can quote 2 Cor. 3:17: “Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom.” Also at other places (e.g. Rom. 8: 9) we can read that Christ is identified with the Holy Spirit. Thus, Christ’s presence is realised by the Spirit and vice versa. The communion with Christ cannot be established without an appeal to the Spirit. And the two of them are revealing the Father. This shows the unity within the Trinity; one of the three cannot be separated from the other persons. Secondly, grace is communicated when one is in Christ. Christians are saints, people who are set apart by God and form together His people. They are free from death and free to live an eternal life. This grace brings people back into the fellowship with God again (with Brümmer’s term: reconciliation). Thirdly, because Christians together form the Body of Christ (Rom. 12:5), they relate to one another in a way that is analogous to the way in which body parts relate. With different functions, strengths, places, and outlooks, they form one unity that presents Christ in this world. As such, the Church is the instrument of God to make Jesus Christ present; being a Christian means more than being an individual believer who sustains his relationship with God. These three functions are summarized by A. A. van Ruler in a book on reasons for attending the church. He says that we are incorporated into the body, which is a communion with saints, sacraments, and the Holy One, the mediator.​[312]​ For Van Ruler, grace is mediated trough the sacraments par excellence in order to bring people into communion with God.  
Now that we have described the relationship as a covenant, we need to wonder whether there is enough space for the individual here. In our analysis of Zizioulas, we came to the conclusion that his model does not diminish the place of the particular believer, but that his/ her identity is not recognized satisfactorily. We have said that God’s love for us is intrinsic, which means that we are appreciated because of who we are. For Zizioulas, it is more important that a person is relational than who he is. His or her personal identity is not of importance within the Church for particularity is not understood as “I am unique” but as “I am someone on my own”. In anatomy, each body part is known for its particular function. By analogy, in the Body of Christ each particular part is known; together they form a living body that acts in the world. In my Introduction, I already referred to possible examples of this presence in the world and we can list some more: praying, diaconal help, evangelisation, preaching and teaching. All these practices are not rewarded because they are related to the Church community (although this is a condition for them), but because they give shape to discipleship of Christ. Their function is of utmost importance, which shows that the particular identity of a believer (or a group of believers who perform a particular practice) is crucial for the Church.

5.7 Evaluation: covenantal relationship 
We will now come to an evaluation of the discussion of my proposal. I have used several metaphors to describe aspects of the relationship between God and man (i.e.: marriage, covenant, friendship). For a comprehensive metaphor, I have proposed to speak of a covenant of love. Because I cannot claim this is already a model (i.e. sustained and systematic metaphor); much more research should be done for such a concept of the covenantal relationship. I admit that I have not outlined a detailed position in Trinitarian theology. The model of the covenant does imply a position with respect to Trinitarian theology. This is a conceptual price we need to pay.​[313]​ It would be interesting to inquire the implications and possibilities for Trinitarian theology. Furthermore, in my proposal, I was not able to pay enough attention to the theology of Zizioulas. It would be interesting to analyse his theology of the Eucharist and to see if this view is fruitful for Western European theology. 






In this systematic theological Thesis, the focus was to look at Christian Faith as a personal relationship between God and man. Christian faith is not primarily about agreeing with truth statements but about living in fellowship with a personal God. My aim was to get insight into the nature of this personal relationship: should we interpret this relationship as (1) a relation between two individuals or (2) between two communal entities? As representatives of respectively individual faith and communal faith, I have chosen to analyse the theologies of Vincent Brümmer and John Zizioulas in depth. 
In Chapter 1, I have developed criteria for systematic theology: a proposal is acceptable to the extent that it is (1) consistent, (2) coherent, (3) consonant with the Christian tradition, (4) adequate for our context and (5) entails a personal understanding of God. Furthermore, we should consider that a model also claims to speak about reality. In Chapter 2, Vincent Brümmer’s model of love as a relationship of mutual fellowship is examined. He speaks of human love relationships, which are personal and which bestow value on the beloved one. By way of analogy, this is applied to the relationship between God and man. God is the one who loves us, by making our good His own. Choosing to live in fellowship with God means to do His will. The relation can be broken and restored. According to John Zizioulas (Chapter 3), the personal relationship between God and man should be perceived as a relation between two communal entities. On the one hand there is the triune God; on the other hand the human person. God the Father is the person to whom we relate, but person should be understood in a relational way. ‘Personhood’ can only exist in communion. This is the ultimate mode of being and therefore God, as ultimate communion (Father, Son and Spirit), is being par excellence. To become human beings without ontological limitations (ecclesial hypostases, or ‘persons’), we should live in communion with God. I have analysed Brümmer’s and Zizioulas’ understanding of personhood, the Trinity, and relationality. Chapter 4 thus has shown us the details and implications of their views. In Chapter 5, we have looked at the conceptual price that has to be paid if we adopt Brümmer’s or Zizioulas’ model. These prices were high, and therefore I inquired: is there a way of conceptualizing the personal relationship without becoming individualists or speculating wildly about intra-trinitarian postulates? 
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